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Abstract 
Essays in Institutional Investor Behavior 
Viktoriya Lantushenko 
 
 
This dissertation consists of one chapter studying mutual fund active management and 
two chapters examining institutional trading in various settings. 
The three essays in my dissertation explore institutional investor behavior. My first paper 
titled “Innovation in mutual fund portfolios: Implications for fund alpha” introduces a new 
measure of portfolio holdings that has power to explain future fund abnormal returns. This 
measure is defined as “return on portfolio innovation.” It is constructed as the return on 
completely new portfolio positions that a fund has not held before. I evaluate the return on newly 
added positions because their performance can signal the quality of managerial effort. On 
average, a one-standard deviation increase in the return on innovation increases the Carhart 
(1997) four-factor fund alpha by approximately 0.34 to 0.52 percent per year. The results have 
important implications for fund performance and manager behavior. 
The second essay titled “Institutional property-type herding in real estate investment 
trusts,” with Edward Nelling, explores whether institutional investors exhibit herding behavior by 
property type in real estate investment trusts (REITs). Our analysis of changes in institutional 
portfolio holdings suggests strong evidence of this behavior. We analyze the autocorrelation in 
aggregate institutional demand, and find that most of it is driven by institutional investor 
following the trades of others. Although momentum trading explains a small amount of this 
herding, institutional property type demand is more strongly associated with lagged institutional 
demand than lagged returns. The results suggest that correlated information signals drive herding 
in REITs.  In addition, we examine the extent to which herding in REIT property types affects 
x  
price performance in the private real estate market.  We find that information transmission 
resulting from institutional herding in REITs occurs faster in public real estate markets than in 
private markets. 
The final essay titled “Investing in innovation: Evidence from institutional trading around 
patent publications,” with Edward Nelling, examines institutional trading activity around patent 
publication dates.  Unlike previous studies that use the future citations count to proxy for patent 
value, we measure the value of innovation by the three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
around announcements.  We find an increase in institutional demand for a firm’s shares around 
patent announcements, and this increase is correlated with announcement returns. In addition, the 
increase in demand is greater when the firm’s shareholder base consists of a higher percentage of 
long-term institutions. We find no correlation between patent announcement returns and the 
future number of citations.  Patent announcements are also associated with increases in liquidity 
and analyst coverage, indicating that innovation may reduce information uncertainty between a 
firm and its investors. In addition, firms that announce patents outperform those in a control 
sample over a long-run. Overall, our results suggest that both investors and firms benefit from 
innovation. 
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CHAPTER 1: INNOVATION IN MUTUAL FUND PORTFOLIOS: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
FUND ALPHA* 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 
This study introduces a new measure of portfolio holdings that has power to explain future fund 
abnormal returns. This measure is defined as “return on portfolio innovation.” It is constructed as 
the return on new portfolio positions that a fund has not held before. I compute the return on these 
positions, and find that the performance of new holdings is strongly and positively associated 
with future fund alpha. On average, a one-standard deviation increase in the return on innovation 
increases the Carhart (1997) four-factor fund alpha by approximately 0.33 to 0.50 percent per 
year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* I would like to graciously thank the members of my dissertation committee - Edward Nelling, Eliezer 
Fich, Daniel Dorn, Greg Nini, and Clemens Sialm - for providing excellent guidance and continued 
support. I also wish to thank Veronika Krepely Pool, Hao Jiang, Naveen Daniel, Michelle Lowry, Jennifer 
Juergens, as well as seminar participants at Drexel University, the Eastern Finance Association 2015 
meeting, and the Southern Finance Association 2015 meeting for their valuable comments. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent studies provide abundant evidence related to the value of active fund management 
(e.g. Chen, Jegadeesh, Wermers (2000), Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005), Kacperczyk, 
Sialm, and Zheng (2008), Cremers and Petajisto (2009), Amihud and Goyenko (2013)). Overall, 
the existing literature suggests that more active funds earn significantly higher returns. In this 
study, I offer a new perspective on the value of fund management. I propose that the evaluation of 
portfolio positions towards which fund managers are likely to exert more effort can provide 
insights regarding the quality of active management. I focus on completely new positions (which 
I define as portfolio innovation) because managers are likely to devote more of their attention and 
effort on new holdings than on existing positions. I evaluate the return of these newly added 
positions (return on innovation), because their performance is likely to signal the quality of 
managerial effort. I find that the performance of new holdings, and not the return on existing 
positions, is strongly and positively associated with future abnormal fund returns.  
There are at least two reasons to believe that the amount of effort dedicated to each 
portfolio position is not constant across fund holdings. First, a mutual fund portfolio, on average, 
consists of about one hundred and sixteen positions. It may be extremely difficult for fund 
managers to pay a great deal of attention and update their expectations for every single position in 
the portfolio each period.1  Second, while adding new holdings to the portfolio, a fund manager 
performs the rather difficult task of screening securities from the universe of stocks to make a 
profitable investment. To some extent, the cost of this process can be associated with neglecting 
other stocks in the portfolio. Overall, it is likely that managers focus their attention and effort 
only on a subset of their holdings at a given time.  
In order to introduce a completely new stock into the portfolio, managers have to exert a 
certain amount of effort to evaluate the qualities of a potential investment. They may need to 
                                                            
 1 A number of studies explore the phenomenon of limited attention (e.g., Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003), 
Peng (2005), Peng and Xiong (2006), Barber and Odean (2008)). 
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conduct a comprehensive analysis of a company's industrial environment, its competitors, its 
customers and suppliers, its governance structure, other factors, and derive a proper valuation to 
justify a fund's exposure to this investment. One can argue that the amount of effort dedicated to 
the process of introducing a new stock is more intensive than it is for updating expectations for 
existing portfolio holdings. Therefore, the evaluation of new positions may provide unique 
insights regarding the value of fund management.  
One would expect that the introduction of new holdings represents greater conviction by 
a fund manager than incremental portfolio changes or passive holdings of existing positions. The 
success at choosing new positions can provide a clearer signal of managerial quality than the 
evaluated performance of the entire portfolio. Therefore, analyzing the performance of new 
holdings may be useful.  
The trading in new and existing positions may be driven by different motivations. For 
example, a simple response to fund inflows would be to scale up existing positions. Such 
marginal portfolio changes are unlikely to be driven by information. The initiation of new 
positions, however, is not just a mechanical shift in the number of shares held. As originally 
noted by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), a fund manager needs to expend resources and incur 
search costs to become informed about new securities, and would require compensation for doing 
so. To the extent that managerial effort manifests itself in the production of superior information, 
I expect it to show up in the performance of new positions.  
For existing holdings, managers are likely to have already done an extensive analysis of 
the company's position in the industry, its specific characteristics, other inputs in the valuation 
process, and the valuation model outcomes. To make a decision about an existing position, 
managers would use their available resources related to the holding, and would update the earlier 
constructed valuation models with newly released information and current beliefs and 
expectations. These resources and the established connections with companies and their analysts 
over time may contribute to managerial ability to make an informed judgment on existing 
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holdings.  
Since there are reasons to believe that both the return on new stocks and the return on 
existing holdings can be informative, I develop two competing hypotheses related to the 
performance attribution of the new and existing portions in a portfolio. On one hand, to the extent 
that managers focus their efforts on portfolio additions more intensively than on existing 
positions, the performance of new stocks should be more informative in explaining future fund 
alpha than the performance of existing holdings. Alternatively, informational signals related to 
existing stocks in a portfolio can be more precise than signals related to new positions, since 
funds have had access to the established connections with companies or their analysts over the 
holding period, and perhaps, obtain an informational advantage from these relationships. If this 
alternative is true, I expect that the performance of existing holdings will be a stronger predictor 
of future fund alpha.  
I find that the performance of new positions is strongly and positively associated with 
future overall risk-adjusted fund returns. In contrast, the performance of existing holdings does 
not predict alpha. This finding supports the managerial effort hypothesis. The relationship 
between the performance of new additions and the next-quarter fund alpha is mostly pronounced 
among smaller funds, and funds with aggressive growth or growth investment styles. These 
results are intuitive. First, since larger funds erode mispricing opportunities faster than smaller 
funds by placing larger trades, the extent to which the return on new securities is informative 
about future fund alpha is inversely associated with fund size. Second, since a larger portion of 
income funds’ cash flows is generated from non-equity securities (relatively to growth funds), the 
return on new stocks is less suitable for funds with this investment objective strategy.  
The results are robust to the alternative identification of new holdings at the fund family 
level, and to possible window-dressing activity of managers. In terms of predicting fund alpha, 
the return on innovation competes with other measures of active management documented in the 
literature, and survives the horse race. Specifically, the return on innovation retains its economic 
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and statistical significance after controlling for other alpha-predictive measures of active 
management. This suggests that the return on innovation captures information about future fund 
alpha that other measures of active management do not. 
I further examine the link between the return on innovation and future fund alpha by 
exploring its persistence over time. I find no persistence in the superior performance on new 
positions. This suggests that the relation between the return on innovation and future fund alpha 
appears to be short-lived. 
My findings show that the return on innovation is one of the measures that captures 
managerial skill. However, the lack of persistence of the relation between the return on 
innovation and future fund alpha over longer horizons suggests that new positions capture 
varying managerial quality. This intuition is consistent with the idea proposed by Kacperczyk, 
Nieuwerburgh, and Veldkamp (2013), who examine time-varying skill. The authors suggest that a 
skilled manager can choose how much of his cognitive ability to allocate to stock-picking or 
market-timing tasks. Similar to this notion, managers can also choose which new securities to 
allocate their effort and attention toward. Thus, if the return on innovation signals managerial 
quality this period, it may or may not capture this next period. This offers a possible explanation 
why the return on innovation captures managerial skill, but it does so only in a short run. 
It is important to note that funds, on average, earn higher returns on the positions toward 
which they allocate heavier weights. This evidence suggests that fund managers make informed 
judgments not only on the choice of new positions, but also on their allocated portfolio weights. 
This supports my conjecture related to the return on innovation explaining managerial skill. 
Of course, managerial effort is not necessarily limited to new positions. Managers may 
devote significant attention to existing holdings. In robustness tests (untabulated), I examine large 
changes in portfolio weights of existing stocks. I find that their performance does not explain 
future fund alpha. This suggests that new positions are better candidates for identifying 
information-driven trades.  
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This study contributes to the literature by offering a novel approach and describing a 
unique channel through which the value of active management is generated. This approach 
involves identifying a subset of portfolio holdings towards which mutual fund managers are 
likely to exert more effort. I document that the performance of these positions, i.e., the innovative 
part of the portfolio, and not the performance of existing positions, predicts overall risk-adjusted 
fund returns. These results are also economically meaningful. A one-standard deviation increase 
in the return on new stocks increases the abnormal fund return by about 33 to 50 basis points per 
year. While other studies identify skillful managers based on portfolio characteristics and show 
their predictability of fund alpha (e.g. Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005), Kacperczyk and 
Seru (2007), Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2008), Cremers and Petajisto (2009), Amihud and 
Goyenko (2013)), I offer a different perspective on the value of active management. I show that 
the performance of new holdings added to the portfolio is informative for identifying skillful 
managers.   
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The following section reviews the relevant 
literature. Section 3 and section 4 describe sample construction and methodological approach, 
respectively. Section 5 reports the empirical results, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
This study is related mainly to numerous papers that explore the value of active management 
in mutual fund performance. One finding that has emerged is that mutual funds that exhibit a 
certain level of specialization as a result of active management in their holdings seem to perform 
better than other funds. For example, Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005) study the industry 
concentration of fund holdings. The authors document that funds concentrated in a few industries 
perform better than diversified funds by about 1% per year after expenses. In addition, Cremers 
and Petajisto (2009) use Active Share to measure the deviation of portfolio holdings from the 
holdings of the benchmark index. Their methodology can be useful to differentiate between 
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various types of active management, such as diversified and concentrated stock picks, factor bets, 
or indexing. They find that funds with the highest Active Share tend to outperform their 
benchmarks, while funds with the lowest Active Share measure tend to underperform. Moreover, 
Cohen, Polk, and Silli (2010) focus on “best idea” stocks, positions with the highest fund 
portfolio weights relative to benchmarks. Their results indicate that these positions outperform 
the remaining stocks in a portfolio. If the value of active management is reflected in the “best 
ideas” positions, then investors can potentially experience gains by investing in less-diversified 
portfolios with a higher tilt towards managerial “best” picks. In addition, Chen, Jegadeesh, and 
Wermers (2000) suggest that examining trades rather than holdings is more informative to assess 
active management. As a result, this study assesses the value of active management by examining 
trades that represent stronger manager opinion, in contrast with marginal portfolio changes or 
existing positions held constant.  
The idea of focusing on new portfolio additions is motivated by the limited attention 
phenomenon. The behavioral finance literature explores investor attention in terms of their 
limited time and ability to process abundant amounts of information in the marketplace. Even 
though attention is difficult to measure, existing studies provide both theoretical and empirical 
insights about investors' attention allocation in financial markets. For example, Peng (2005) 
shows that investors optimally allocate their limited attention across different sources of 
uncertainty to minimize their wealth uncertainty. Kacperczyk, Van Nieuwerburgh, and Veldkamp 
(2012) model the activity of investment managers, accounting for the fact that they have finite 
mental capacity to process information. The authors provide support for managerial skill and 
rational allocation of attention in the investment process. Among empirical works, Corwin and 
Coughenour (2008) suggest that the allocation of effort due to limited attention affects liquidity in 
the market. Even though the effects of limited attention are more pronounced for individual 
investors than for institutional investors, according to Barber and Odean (2008), this behavioral 
phenomenon is widespread. 
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This study also is related to other papers examining the behavior of fund investors. For 
example, Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998), and others document that 
investors disproportionally chase high-performing funds, while failing to withdraw from funds 
with lower performance. I confirm this well-established relationship between investment flows 
and past fund returns. Consistent with existing studies, I find that fund investors are likely to 
judge the quality of managers based on the overall fund performance. In other words, fund 
investors do not seem to monitor the performance of disaggregated portfolio holdings when 
allocating their wealth.  
 
3. Data and sample construction 
The data for this study come from four sources. First, I obtain monthly returns, expenses, 
total net assets, turnover ratio, investment objectives, and other fund characteristics from the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Survivor-Bias-Free Mutual Fund database. 
Second, the Thomson holdings database provides data on mutual fund equity holdings. Third, I 
use Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) MFLINKS table to merge the mentioned above 
datasets.2  Finally, individual stock prices and returns are obtained from the CRSP monthly stock 
file. 
I focus my analysis on domestic actively managed equity mutual funds with aggressive 
growth, growth, and growth and income investment styles. I eliminate index, international, 
balanced, and bond funds from the sample. Since mutual fund characteristics data are rather 
sparse prior to 1990 in the CRSP database, I concentrate my analysis on the 1990-2011 period. 
There are a number of mutual funds with multiple share classes. Typically, fund share classes 
differ in fee structure and clientele (institutional or retail). Similar to the procedures documented 
in the literature (e.g., Wermers (2000), Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2008), Cremers and 
Petajisto (2009)), I combine multiple share classes into one fund. Total assets under management 
                                                            
2 Refer to Wermers (2000) for details on the merging procedures. 
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(TNA) for each fund are calculated as a summation of all values of assets across multiple fund 
shares. Fund age is the maximum age of its share classes. For the remaining fund characteristics, I 
aggregate different class shares by taking the TNA-weighted average across all share classes of a 
fund.  
I exclude all funds with total assets under management (TNA) below $15 million, because 
Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2001) suggest that the returns of funds with TNA less than $15 million 
are biased upwards in the CRSP Mutual Fund database. To avoid possible look-ahead-bias, funds 
with TNA less than $15 million are excluded as of the beginning of month. Consistent with other 
studies, I remove fund observations with fewer than 11 stocks in a portfolio.3 In addition, I 
exclude the first 18 months of fund returns to decrease the impact of incubation bias reported by 
Evans (2010). I track fund holdings from the fund's origination. Since the Thomson holdings 
database provides data starting 1980, I do not observe holdings of funds that were established 
prior to 1980. For this reason, I remove funds that originated prior to 1980.4 Overall, my final 
sample consists of 1,482 funds.  
Panel A of Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of fund characteristics. An average fund 
in the sample manages about $1.7 billion in assets, holds 116 stocks, is 13 years old, has an 
expense ratio of 1.15%, and incurs a turnover ratio of about 76%. An average fund achieves a raw 
portfolio return net of expense of 1.46% and a Carhart (1997) four-factor alpha of -0.15%. 
Overall, these summary statistics are consistent with those reported in the mutual fund literature 
(e.g., Huang, Sialm, and Zhang (2011), Jiang and Verardo (2013), Amihud and Goyenko (2013)). 
 
 
                                                            
3 According to the Investment Company Act (1940), section 5(b)1, this filter limits my sample to funds 
with at least 50% of fund's assets invested in equities. A fund is defined as diversified if no more than 5% 
of its assets is invested in one security. Therefore, funds with fewer than 10 stocks in the portfolio have less 
than 50% of their assets dedicated to equities. This filter is common in the mutual fund literature (e.g. 
Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2008)). 
4 Relaxing this restriction does not affect results qualitatively. 
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4. Methodology 
This section describes the method of fund portfolio disaggregation. Each period (usually 
quarter), I decompose fund holdings into two portions: 1) innovative (all newly added stocks that 
a fund never held before); 2) stagnant (all existing portfolio holdings that a fund held in the past). 
To do so, I analyze a fund's portfolio holdings in quarter t-1 and identify new and existing 
positions. A holding of a fund is considered new if it has not been owned by a fund since its 
inception.5 Existing positions are defined as those that previously appeared among fund holdings. 
If a fund has held a position in the past, liquidated this stock, and then reintroduced this position 
in quarter t-1, this stock is classified as existing. Portfolio innovation in quarter t-1 is defined as a 
summation of portfolio weights of newly added positions: 
 
ܲ݋ݎݐ݂݋݈݅݋ ݅݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݅݋݊௙,௧ିଵ ൌ ෍ ௝߱,௙,௧ିଵ
௃
௝ୀ଴
 
 
 
(1) 
 
where J is the number of new positions added to a portfolio in quarter t-1 and ௝߱,௙,௧ିଵ is the 
portfolio weight assigned to a new position. In contrast, portfolio stagnation is defined as a 
summation of portfolio weights of all existing positions in quarter t-1: 
 
ܲ݋ݎݐ݂݋݈݅݋ ݏݐܽ݃݊ܽݐ݅݋݊௙,௧ିଵ ൌ ෍߱௞,௙,௧ିଵ
௄
௞ୀ଴
 
 
 
(2) 
 
where K is a number of existing portfolio holdings in quarter t-1 and ߱݇,݂,ݐെ1 is a portfolio 
weight of existing position k. If a fund does not purchase any new positions in quarter t-1, its 
portfolio innovation is zero. Since the first 18 months of fund returns are removed (described 
earlier), the first quarter of a fund's existence is not in the sample. This procedure helps to avoid 
bias from having 100% in portfolio innovation. In addition, I remove new positions that are initial 
                                                            
5 The identification of new positions relies on the historical quarterly mutual fund holdings reported by 
Thomson Financial. A stock that is, in fact, a part of the portfolio, but is not recorded in the Thomson 
database, can potentially be misclassified. 
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public offerings (IPOs) to eliminate the effects of “mechanical innovation” at the market level. 
On average, only about 30 basis points of portfolio innovation is dedicated to IPOs. This filter 
does not affect the results qualitatively. 
The next step involves evaluating the performance of new and existing positions 
identified in quarter t-1. The performance of these positions is assessed in the next period, quarter 
t. I use three methods to evaluate the performance of portfolio innovation and stagnation in 
quarter t: unadjusted raw stock returns, market-adjusted stock returns, and DGTW-adjusted 
(Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997)) returns. The unadjusted return on innovation is 
calculated as follows: 
 
ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊ ݋݊ ݅݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݅݋݊௙,௧௨௡௔ௗ௝ ൌ ෍ ௝߱,௙,௧ିଵ ௝ܴ,௧
௃
௝ୀ଴
 
 
 
(3) 
where J is the total number of new stock additions to fund f's portfolio in quarter t-1, ௝߱,௙,௧ିଵ is a 
portfolio weight that the fund allocates to a new stock, and ௝ܴ,௧ is the return of a new position. 
The market-adjusted return on innovation is assessed as follows: 
 
ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊	݋݊ ݅݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݅݋݊௙,௧௠௞௧ ൌ ෍ ௝߱,௙,௧ିଵሺܴ௝,௧ െ
௃
௝ୀ଴
ܴ௧௠௞௧ሻ 
 
 
(4) 
where ܴ௧௠௞௧ is the quarterly market return obtained by compounding monthly market returns. The 
monthly market return is a value-weighted return of all securities listed in CRSP.  
I follow Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) (hereafter, DGTW) to construct 
125 benchmark portfolios based on size, book-to-market ratio, and momentum. Every quarter, 
benchmark portfolios of stocks are matched to each stock in a fund’s portfolio according to its 
designated position in dimensions of the three characteristics. The DGTW-adjusted return on 
portfolio innovation is calculated as follows: 
 
ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊	݋݊	݅݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݅݋݊௙,௧஽ீ்ௐ ൌ ෍ ௝߱,௙,௧ିଵሺܴ௝,௧ െ
௃
௝ୀ଴
ܴ௧஽ீ்ௐሻ 
 
 
(5) 
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where ܴ௧஽ீ்ௐ is the value-weighted return on a corresponding benchmark DGTW-portfolio.  
Panel B of Table 1 reports characteristics of and returns on portfolio innovation. On 
average, 5.98% of a mutual fund portfolio includes newly added positions. This statistic is 
reasonable and comparable to those reported in the literature. For example, Baker, Litov, 
Wachter, and Wurgler (2010) document that mutual funds allocate, on average, about 18% of the 
portfolio to “first buy” during the period of 1980 through 2005. The first buys are defined as 
those holdings for which a portfolio weight goes from 0 to a positive value. These stocks are not 
necessarily entirely new. They may have been a part of the portfolio in the past. Given that I 
focus on holdings that funds have not held before, my evidence suggests that the portfolio weight 
allocated to such additions is a bit lower than that allocated to first buys. In terms of the 
propensity for portfolio innovation, mutual funds in my sample add at least one completely new 
investment to their portfolio composition 94% of the time.  
The portfolio-weighted return on newly added stocks, both adjusted and unadjusted, is 
nearly zero, with a standard deviation of about 1% (DGTW-adjusted) to 2% (unadjusted). By 
construction, such a small average return on portfolio innovation is a result of applying relatively 
small portfolio weights to returns on newly added positions. Portfolio stagnation is evaluated 
similarly to portfolio innovation, except that portfolio weights and returns are used for existing 
positions, and not for newly added stocks. Refer to the Appendix for a detailed description of 
defining and evaluating portfolio stagnation, including unadjusted, market-, and DGTW-adjusted 
returns.6 
Panel C of Table 1 reports characteristics of and returns on portfolio stagnation. Overall, 
these summary statistics indicate that the return on innovation per unit of portfolio weight is 
greater than the return on stagnation per unit of weight. For example, comparing the market-
adjusted performance, the return on innovation per unit of portfolio weight 
                                                            
6 The Appendix also contains all other variable definitions. 
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(0.13%/0.0598=2.17%) is about 1.84 times greater than the return on stagnation per unit of 
weight (1.11%/0.9402=1.18%).  
I also examine other characteristics of new and existing holdings. This analysis is 
performed conditionally on adding at least one new position to the portfolio. Panel D of Table 1 
reports the results of comparative statistics. Each quarter, I estimate the cross-sectional 
differences in characteristics of new and existing positions. I calculate t-statistics based on a time-
series of the cross-sectional averages. It is worthwhile to note that a stock can be a new position 
for some funds, and an existing position for other funds. Overall, new positions tend to be larger 
in size and less risky than existing holdings. In addition, new portfolio additions have, on 
average, a smaller market-to-book ratio and a smaller stock turnover. The average raw return of 
new stocks does not substantially differ from the average raw return of existing positions. 
 
5. Empirical results  
5.1.   Portfolio innovation and mutual fund performance 
This subsection investigates the relationship between the return on innovation and stagnation 
and fund alpha. Portfolio innovation, on its own, is not expected to explain future fund abnormal 
performance, because simply adding more stocks to a portfolio does not provide enough 
information about managerial quality and future performance prospects of a fund. However, the 
return on innovation can capture managerial success at efforts exerted to add completely new 
positions to their portfolios, and may help explain subsequent fund performance. On one hand, if 
fund managers concentrate their efforts on completely new positions more than on existing 
positions, the success at adding new positions can be expected to be more informative to explain 
future fund performance than the performance of existing holdings. On the other hand, the 
precision of information about existing holdings can be sharper than that related to completely 
new holdings, given that funds had more opportunities to explore the qualities of existing 
investments over a holding period. Therefore, the performance associated with portfolio 
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stagnation may be a more significant determinant of future fund alpha. To test these conjectures, I 
estimate the following panel regression: 
 ߙ௙,௧ାଵ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊ ݋݊ ݅݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݅݋ ௙݊,௧ ൅ ߚଶ ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊ ݋݊ ݏݐܽ݃݊ܽݐ݅݋݊௙,௧
൅ 	߰	ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௙,௧ ൅ ߝ௙,௧ାଵ  
 
(6) 
 
where ߙ௙,௧ାଵ denotes an abnormal return of fund f over quarter t+1. To clarify the timeline, I 
identify new and existing holdings in quarter (t-1), evaluate the return on innovation and the 
return on stagnation in quarter t, and estimate fund alpha in quarter (t+1). I use two measures of 
abnormal returns, unconditional and conditional. Unconditional abnormal returns of a fund are 
estimated from the Carhart (1997) four-factor models. For each fund, time-series regressions of 
excess monthly fund returns on four zero-investment factor portfolios along dimensions of excess 
market return, size, value, and momentum are estimated using the preceding 36 months of data.7 
As in Carhart (1997), the abnormal performance at time τ+1 is computed by taking the fund 
return at time τ+1 in excess of the risk-free rate and subtracting the fitted value of the return using 
the factor loadings estimated over the prior 36 months. Conditional abnormal returns are 
estimated following Ferson and Schadt (1996). More specifically, in addition to the four factors in 
the Carhart (1997) model, the conditional model also includes interaction terms between the 
excess market returns and several demeaned macroeconomic variables.8 The quarterly alpha, 
unconditional or conditional, is obtained by compounding monthly fund alphas within each 
quarter. 
ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊	݋݊	݅݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݅݋݊௙,௧ (ݏݐܽ݃݊ܽݐ݅݋݂݊,ݐሻ is the evaluated performance over quarter t of 
new (existing) holdings identified in t-1. The Appendix provides more detailed definitions of 
returns on innovation and stagnation. ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௙,௧ is a vector of fund characteristics, including the 
                                                            
7 I also experimented with rolling windows of previous 12 and 24 monthly fund returns to estimate monthly 
fund alphas. The results are qualitatively similar. 
8 The three-month Treasury bill rate, the dividend yield of the CRSP value-weighted index, term spread 
(difference between 10-year Treasury note and 3-month Treasury bill), and default spread (difference 
between yields on AAA and BAA corporate bonds). These data are obtained from 
http://www.research.stlouisfed.org/fred2. 
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natural logarithm of fund total net assets under management, the logarithm of age, total expense 
ratio, turnover, flows, and the number of stocks in a portfolio. The vector  ψ contains coefficients 
for each control. Regressions are estimated with quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered at the fund level.  
The results of estimation are reported in Table 2. Panel A provides the results with 
unconditional abnormal fund return. Across all specifications, the return on innovation is strongly 
and positively associated with future abnormal fund performance. The results are robust to 
various methods of assessing the innovation performance, as well as to the inclusion of controls 
for fund characteristics. In contrast, the return on portfolio stagnation does not predict future fund 
alpha. 
These results are consistent with the explanation that fund managers focus significantly 
more effort on newly introduced positions. This evidence does not reject the notion that fund 
managers may trade on information regarding their existing holdings. However, the effect of such 
trading on fund alpha may be attenuated by mechanical scaling of other maintained holdings 
driven by changes in fund flows. Overall, the success at portfolio innovation, and not the return 
on portfolio stagnation, appears to drive future risk-adjusted fund performance. The coefficients 
on the remaining explanatory variables in the considered models are generally consistent in 
direction and statistical significance with those documented in the literature (e.g. Kacperczyk and 
Seru (2007), Cremers and Petajisto (2009)). 
These findings are also economically significant. For example, on average, a one-
standard deviation increase in returns on innovation increases the Carhart (1997) four-factor fund 
alpha by approximately 0.33 to 0.50 percent per year, depending on the measurement of the 
return on innovation.  
Panel B of Table 2 reports the results of the analysis with conditional fund abnormal 
returns. Measuring fund risk-adjusted returns conditionally on economic factors also produces 
statistically and economically significant results. On average, a one-standard deviation increase in 
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the return on innovation increases the conditional four-factor abnormal return by 33 to 55 basis 
points per year. 
Alternatively, I examine the effects of the return on new and existing positions without 
applying portfolio weights as in Eq. (3). More specifically, I treat each part, innovative and 
stagnant, as its own portfolio. First, I measure the return on new positions as the equally-weighted 
raw return across all newly added stocks, ሺ∑ ܴ݆,ݐሻܬ݆ൌ0 /ܬ, where J is the number of new positions 
added in quarter t-1. Analogously, the return on existing positions is the equally-weighted raw 
return on the remaining portion of the portfolio. I re-estimate model (6), having the average raw 
returns on new and existing securities, instead of the returns on innovation and stagnation. The 
results are reported in Panel C of Table 2. The economic interpretation and statistical significance 
of these results remain both quantitatively and qualitatively consistent.  
In addition, I measure the return on new positions as the value-weighted raw return 
across all newly added stocks. In this approach, the return on new holdings is weighted by the 
dollar value of these positions in the portfolio. In contrast to the definition of the return on 
innovation, these weights add up to 1 within the innovative portion of the portfolio. Similarly, I 
estimate the value-weighted returns on existing holdings. Panel D presents the results of the Eq. 
(6) estimation using these alternative methods of return measurement. Even though the results are 
not as strongly significant as in previous panels, they confirm the earlier findings by revealing 
that the return on new additions has a much stronger power to predict fund alpha in the next 
period than the return on the existing portion of the portfolio.  
Furthermore, I explore the economic significance of these findings in more detail by 
examining the relation between the return on innovation and future fund abnormal performance 
using a calendar-time regression approach. In each quarter (t+1), I sort all funds into deciles 
based on the return on innovation in quarter t. I then calculate equally-weighted returns for the 
funds in each decile. Next, I run calendar-time regressions of these quarterly fund returns in 
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excess of a quarterly risk-free rate on the CAPM model, the Fama-French three-factor model, and 
the Carhart four-factor model. Quarterly returns on factor portfolios are obtained by 
compounding monthly returns. Table 3 reports the results of this calendar-time regression. 
Consistent with the earlier findings, these results reveal that funds with superior returns on 
innovation tend to earn a significantly higher alpha subsequently. The difference in the four-
factor alphas in the highest and lowest decile portfolios is 1.54%.  
When sorting on the return on stagnation to run the calendar-time regression approach, 
the difference between the highest and lowest deciles is 3% with a t-statistic of 2.98 
(untabulated). However, I believe that the pooled regression approach is more suitable for three 
reasons. First, since 94% of portfolio consists of existing (not new) positions, this result from the 
return on stagnation sort may reflect some persistence in fund returns, which are used for both the 
sorting procedure and alpha calculation in the next quarter. Second, the calendar-time regression 
approach assumes that the risk factors are constant. However, the results show that managerial 
preferences for styles or characteristics (size, market-to-book ratio, past returns) of new positions 
change over time. Also, the panel approach allows controlling for fund characteristics and other 
variables. 
5.2.   Determinants of future portfolio innovation and the return on innovation 
This subsection investigates the determinants of managerial tendency to pursue 
innovation in fund portfolios. A certain level of autocorrelation in portfolio innovation is 
expected. The reason is that the sample consists of actively managed funds, and therefore, it is 
suspected that managers of these funds frequently search for new investment opportunities to be 
incorporated into their portfolios. In addition, the main drivers of innovation can be related to 
available resources allocated to expanding portfolio holdings and motivational cues. For example, 
funds with higher expense ratios may have more resources available to introduce new positions to 
a portfolio. Moreover, if fund managers are successful at introducing new positions, it may 
motivate them to keep actively searching for more investment opportunities for their portfolios. 
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 ܲ݋ݎݐ݂݋݈݅݋	݅݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݅݋݊௙,௧ାଵ
ൌ ߚ଴൅ ߚଵ	ܲ݋ݎݐ݂݋݈݅݋ ݅݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݅݋݊௙,௧ ൅ ߚଶ ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊ ݋݊ ݅݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݅݋݊௙,௧
൅ ߚଷ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊ ݋݊ ݏݐܽ݃݊ܽݐ݅݋݊௙,௧ ൅ ߰ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௙,௧ ൅ 	ߝ௙,௧ାଵ	 
 
(7) 
 
A set of controls include the natural logarithm of size of assets under management, a logarithm of 
age, expense and turnover ratios, fund return, flows, and the number of stocks in a portfolio. 
Quarter fixed effects are included, and standard errors are clustered at the fund level. Since at 
certain points of time funds choose to not introduce new positions to the portfolio at all, portfolio 
innovation is censored with a lower bound of zero. For this reason, I examine the determinants of 
portfolio innovation through the frameworks of both ordinary least squares (OLS) and Tobit 
regressions. The results are reported in Table 4. 
As expected, there is autocorrelation in portfolio innovation. Fund size and the number of 
equities in the portfolio are strongly and negatively associated with the next-period innovation 
tendency. Smaller funds may have under-optimized portfolios in terms of the number of holdings, 
and therefore, may have a higher tendency to innovate. A similar reasoning can be used to explain 
a negative coefficient on Log(Age). Younger funds are more likely to add new securities to their 
portfolios. A positive relationship between turnover and portfolio innovation is not surprising, 
since adding more positions to the portfolio is fundamentally related to portfolio turnover.  
The negative and significant coefficient on Flows does not support the conjecture that 
funds are likely to expose their portfolio to new stocks with more resources (or flows) coming in. 
One potential explanation for this result can be managerial motivational cues. Since new money 
flows can serve as a proxy for investor perceptions about a fund, after experiencing a reduction in 
new money flows, managers may feel the need to change the composition of their portfolios by 
adding new holdings. In addition, this observation can be reconciled with the findings of 
Alexander, Cici, and Gibson (2007). These authors suggest that a manager who purchases stocks 
after experiencing significant outflows is likely to believe that these stocks are substantially 
19  
undervalued. As a result, such motivation-driven buys outperform the benchmarks. Therefore, the 
negative and significant coefficient on Flows in Table 4 may indicate that new additions to the 
portfolios are likely to be valuation-motivated purchases. This is consistent with the finding 
reported in Panel D of Table 1, that new positions tend to have a smaller market-to-book ratio 
than existing ones.  
Furthermore, it is interesting to explore the effect of the overall fund return and the 
performance of new and existing securities on future innovation tendency. Models (1) and (2) in 
Table 4 suggest that the overall fund return does not affect the tendency of a fund to introduce 
new positions to the portfolio. However, as the fund return is decomposed into two portions, 
attributed to innovation and stagnation, the results provide a more detailed explanation for 
motivational cues related to portfolio innovation. More specifically, the findings suggest that 
successful innovators exhibit a higher tendency to add new securities to their portfolios. 
Managers may feel motivated to innovate more after having done so successfully. In contrast, if 
the return on the stagnant portfolio portion decreases, this appears to lead to a fund’s higher 
exposure to new opportunities. Perhaps, when existing portfolio holdings do not perform well, 
managers may feel the urgency to search for promising new investments.  
While learning more about the return on portfolio innovation, it is natural to ask if funds 
with certain characteristics tend to be better at introducing new additions to their portfolios. 
Therefore, I next examine the determinants of the return on new portfolio additions. 
Conditionally on adding new positions to the portfolio, I regress the raw return on new holdings 
(equally- or value-weighted) on its one-quarter lag, portfolio innovation, and a set of controls. 
The set of controls includes the natural logarithm of total net assets under management, the 
logarithm of age, total expense ratio, turnover, flows, quarterly portfolio return, and two dummy 
variables indicating whether a fund’s investment objective is classified as “growth” or 
“aggressive growth.” All independent variables are measured over the quarter preceding the 
quarter of the dependent variable measurement.  
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Table 5 presents the results of this estimation. I find a strong positive relationship 
between portfolio innovation and the raw return on new holdings. This indicates that the more 
managers choose to allocate to new positions, the higher subsequent returns on the innovative 
portion of their portfolio. However, the results suggest that the returns on new stocks are 
negatively autocorrelated. One possible explanation for this observation can be managerial 
overconfidence. More specifically, after observing superior performance on the recently added 
stocks, fund managers may overestimate their abilities and make poorer investment choices in the 
following period. 
In addition, the results of Table 5 reveal that smaller funds tend to be more successful at 
choosing new portfolio additions. This finding can be explained by liquidity constraints. A larger 
fund’s trades have a greater effect on stock prices, and therefore, mispricing opportunities can be 
eliminated faster. Moreover, funds with higher past portfolio returns tend to introduce new 
securities more successfully.  
5.3. Portfolio innovation and other fund alpha-predictive measures 
This subsection compares fund alpha-predictive power of the return on portfolio 
innovation with other measures of active management documented in the literature. I compare the 
return on portfolio innovation with the following measures of active management: Active Share 
(Cremers and Petajisto (2009)), Industry Concentration Index (Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng 
(2005)), Fund R2 (Amihud and Goyenko (2013)), and Return Gap (Kacperczyk, Sialm, and 
Zheng (2008)). The Spearman correlations of the return on innovation with these measures are 
3.62%, -0.26%, -1.21%, -1.20%, respectively. 
First, I explore if the alpha-predictive power of the return on innovation survives after 
including the Active Share measure in the model. Cremers and Petajisto (2009) define this active 
management measure as follows:9 
                                                            
9 I thank Antti Petajisto for making the Active Share data available for public use: 
http://www.petajisto.net/data.html 
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(8) 
where ߱௙௨௡ௗ,௜ and ߱௜௡ௗ௘௫,௜ are the portfolio weights of asset i in the fund and in the index. Active 
Share in my sample averages at 0.77 (median=0.80) with a standard deviation of 0.17. Model (1) 
in Table 6 reports the result of regressing future fund abnormal return on the measure of Active 
Share. Consistent with Cremers and Petajisto (2009), this model produces a positive and 
significant coefficient. Next, I include the Active Share variable into the model with the return on 
innovation, the return on stagnation, and a set of controls. The vector of controls consists of fund 
flows, the natural logarithm of age, expense ratio, turnover ratio, the log of net assets under 
management, and the log of the number of stocks in the portfolio. All models in Table 6 use the 
DGTW-adjusted return on innovation and stagnation.10 Model (2) of Table 6 demonstrates that 
the return on innovation remains highly significant after including this alternative measure of 
active management.  
Additionally, I replicate Industry Concentration Index (ICI) proposed by Kacperczyk, 
Sialm, and Zheng (2005) and compute ICI for each fund f at time t as follows: 
 
ܫܥܫ௙,௧ ൌ ෍ሺ߱௝,௜ െ
ଵ଴
௝ୀଵ
ഥ߱௝,௜ሻଶ 
 
 
(9) 
 
where ௝߱,௜ is the weight of the mutual fund holdings in industry j and ഥ߱௝,௜ is the weight of the 
market in industry j a time t. The summary statistics for ICI in the sample of mutual funds are 
similar to those reported in Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005). ICI averages 10.23%, with a 
median of 4.35%, and a standard deviation of 15.79%. Similar to Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng 
(2005), Model (3) of Table 6 shows that there is a strong positive association between ICI of a 
fund and its next-quarter abnormal performance. Additionally, Model (4) incorporates the return 
on innovation, the return on stagnation, and fund-specific controls. The variable of interest, the 
                                                            
10 The results for this analysis are similar with unadjusted and market-adjusted measures and are available 
upon request. 
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return on innovation, remains predictive of future fund alpha, while the return on stagnation does 
not.  
I consider another measure of active management, Fund R2, proposed by Amihud and 
Goyenko (2013). The authors document that fund performance can be predicted by a stock-
selectivity measure, R2, obtained from a regression of fund returns on multifactor models. I 
replicate this measure of selectivity and obtain R2. Consistent with Amihud and Goyenko (2013), 
Fund R2 is strongly and negatively related to future fund alpha (Model (5) of Table 6). Since a 
lower R2 represents a higher level of stock selection, as suggested by the authors, funds with 
lower R2 earn significantly higher returns than funds with greater R2. Return on portfolio 
innovation, however, remains highly significant after including this alternative measure of active 
management, as Model (6) of Table 6 reports. 
I also estimate the Return Gap measure proposed by Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng 
(2008). As suggested by the authors, Return Gap is a proxy for unobserved mutual fund actions, 
and is defined as the difference between the reported fund return and the return on a portfolio that 
invests in recently disclosed fund holdings. Model (7) of Table 6 shows that there is a positive 
relationship between Return Gap and future fund alpha. However, as Model (8) of Table 6 
reports, the inclusion of Return Gap does not change the importance of the return on portfolio 
innovation as a predictor of future fund alpha.11 
Finally, Model (9) in Table 6 incorporates all considered measures of active management, 
as well as fund-specific controls. Combining all considered variables of active management into 
one model does not produce an extremely high degree of multicollinearity. The strongest 
Spearman correlation is found between Active Share and Fund R2and equals to -54%. The 
variable of interest, the return on innovation, remains highly positively significant in terms of 
predicting future fund abnormal return, whereas the return on stagnation does not. Moreover, the 
                                                            
11 To reduce noise, I use the average Return Gap over previous 36 months prior to the alpha estimation 
quarter. The results do not change qualitatively, if I use Return Gap measured over the most recent quarter. 
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return on innovation retains its economic significance after including other alpha-predictive 
measures together with the set of controls. 
5.4.   Is the return on innovation persistent? 
In this subsection, I explore if the return on new securities predicts fund alpha over longer 
horizons. This analysis is performed conditionally on initiating new positions. More specifically, 
fund-quarter observations are removed if a fund does not introduce a new stock to the portfolio in 
a given quarter. Since funds initiate new holdings 94% of the time over their lives, this 
conditioning does not result in losing a large number of observations. In each quarter t, I sort all 
funds into quintiles based on the return on new positions. The lowest (highest) quintile contains 
funds with the lowest (highest) return on initiations. I then calculate equally-weighted returns on 
new securities in each quintile for the subsequent six quarters from the formation quarter t.  
Table 7 reveals that the returns on new holdings are not persistent over time. More 
specifically, the difference in average returns on new securities for the lowest and highest 
quintiles is not statistically significant in any of the six subsequent quarters.12 This suggests that 
the performance of new holdings appears to be only short-lived in alpha.  
5.5.   Portfolio innovation and mutual fund flows 
Existing studies report an asymmetric response of fund flows to past fund performance 
(e.g. Sirri and Tufano (1998)). The extent to which portfolio innovation measures effort exertion, 
and success at innovation assesses the value of active management, may affect future fund flows. 
If fund investors recognize managerial efforts reflected in the successful introduction of new 
stocks to their portfolios, then one would expect a strong and positive relationship between 
success at innovation and future fund flows. Alternatively, it is reasonable to believe that fund 
investors judge managerial quality by the overall portfolio performance, and chase competitive 
past fund returns when allocating their wealth. Therefore, the variation in returns on innovation 
                                                            
12 Alternatively, I perform the analysis by sorting funds based on the return on innovation, rather than on 
the raw return on new positions. The results confirm the lack of persistence in the return on innovation. 
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may be obscured by overall fund returns, and the evaluated success at adding new securities may 
be insignificant in explaining future fund flows.  
Similarly, if fund investors do not monitor portfolio holdings to recognize managerial 
efforts at adding new positions, portfolio innovation is expected to be unrelated to future fund 
flows. In contrast, exposing portfolios to new positions may contribute to the concept of active 
fund management in investors' perceptions, and therefore, portfolio innovation can be expected to 
be positively associated with future fund flows. 
To explore these predictions empirically, the following panel regression is estimated: 
 ܨ݈݋ݓݏ௙,௧ାଵ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ	ܲ݋ݎݐ݂݋݈݅݋ ݅݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݅݋݊௙,௧ ൅ ߚଶ ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊ ݋݊ ݅݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݅݋݊௙,௧
൅ ߚଷ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊ ݋݊ ݏݐܽ݃݊ܽݐ݅݋݊௙,௧ ൅ ߰ ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௙,௧ ൅ ߝ௙,௧ାଵ	 
 
(10) 
 
The dependent variable, Flows, is a quarterly growth rate of assets under management after 
adjusting for the appreciation of fund assets: 
 ܨ݈݋ݓݏ௙,௧ାଵ ൌ ܶܰܣ௙,௧ାଵ െ ܶܰܣ௙,௧ሺ1 ൅ ௙ܴ,௧ାଵሻܶܰܣ௙,௧  
 
(11) 
 
where ܶܰܣ݂,ݐ is total net assets of fund f at the end of period t, and ܴ݂,ݐ൅1 is the fund return over 
the period starting in t and ending in t+1.13 Fund-specific characteristics are included as controls: 
the natural logarithm of size of assets under management, logarithm of age, expense ratio, 
turnover ratio, fund raw and risk-adjusted returns, and the number of stocks in the portfolio. In 
addition, a measure of risk, calculated as a standard deviation of its returns over past 36 months, 
is also included, along with time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level. 
Table 8 reports the regression results. Portfolio innovation does not appear to be 
associated with future fund flows. Based on these results, it is likely that fund investors do not 
systematically monitor portfolio holdings or simply do not react to new additions. This evidence 
                                                            
13 Berk and Tonks (2007) suggest that the denominator in the Flows calculation should be  
ܶܰܣ௙,௧ሺ1 ൅ ௙ܴ,௧ାଵሻ to fully capture the percentage change in new funds. The results of this study hold with 
this suggested method of Flows estimation. 
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suggests that fund investors, on average, may not recognize managerial efforts to expose their 
portfolios to completely new investment opportunities. Also, consistent with existing studies 
(e.g., Sirri and Tufano (1998), Kacperczyk and Seru (2007)), past fund returns, raw or risk-
adjusted, are highly and positively related to future flows (Models (1) and (2) in Table 8).  
Models (3) through (8) in Table 8 use the return on innovation and the return on 
stagnation in the place of overall portfolio performance. This test is performed to run a 
comparative analysis between the effect of the return on innovation and the return on stagnation 
on future fund flows. Both variables appear to be strong and positive predictors of future flows. 
The performance of the stagnant portion of a portfolio, however, is found to be more strongly 
associated with future flows than the performance of new securities. Generally, highly significant 
coefficients on the return on innovation and stagnation can simply be a result of their correlation 
with the overall portfolio return.  
5.6.   Robustness 
5.6.1. Managerial window dressing 
Some evidence in the literature suggests that institutional investors can engage in 
window-dressing behavior. For example, Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler, and Vishny (1991) 
examine pension funds and find that sales of losers increase significantly in the fourth quarter, 
when investors are likely to monitor fund portfolios more carefully. Ng and Wang (2004) also 
document the evidence of the turn-of-the-year trading activity by institutional investors. Such 
behavior is interpreted as window dressing. Similarly, mutual fund managers may be motivated to 
disclose disproportionally their holdings toward stocks that have performed relatively well over a 
reporting period in an attempt to attract more inflows.  
With respect to the findings of this study, one may argue that fund managers add new 
well-performing stocks to window-dress their portfolios. Considering this possible behavioral 
tendency, I reevaluate the effect of the return on innovation and stagnation on the next-quarter 
fund alpha. Using the two measures of window-dressing, Backward Holding Return Gap (BHRG) 
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and Rank Gap, proposed by Agarwal, Gay, and Ling (2014), I run the regression model in 
Equation (6) controlling for such managerial tendency.14 The first proxy for window dressing, 
BHRG, is constructed as the difference between the quarterly return of a hypothetical portfolio 
observed based on the quarter-end holdings and the fund's reported quarter return. The second 
measure, Rank Gap, is derived based on the three percentile rankings: fund performance rank, the 
rank of portfolio proportion dedicated to winner stocks, and the rank of portfolio proportion 
allocated to loser stocks. Rank Gap represents the difference between a fund's performance rank 
and the average of the two ranks of winner and loser proportions. The higher BHRG or Rank Gap, 
the greater is the likelihood of window dressing.15 Since the window-dressing activity involves 
unnecessary rebalancing of a portfolio, it is believed to affect the subsequent fund performance 
adversely.  
Consistent with Agarwal, Gay, and Ling (2014), I account for managerial window-
dressing by including a dummy indicator that is equal to 1 if the fund is in the top BHRG or Rank 
Gap decile; and 0, otherwise.  Panel A of Table 9 reports the results. As expected, both proxies 
for managerial window dressing negatively impact a fund’s future abnormal return.  In addition, 
the results for both the return on innovation and the return on stagnation are consistent with 
earlier findings: it is the performance of new portfolio holdings, and not the performance of 
existing positions that is strongly and positively associated with future fund alpha. 
5.6.2. Investment objective styles 
Next, I analyze if the effects of the return on innovation and the return on stagnation 
persist across mutual funds with different investment styles. Using the investment objective codes 
from the Thomson Financial mutual fund dataset, I run the regression model outlined by Equation 
(6) for the three groups of funds with the following investment styles: aggressive growth, growth, 
                                                            
14 I thank Vikas Agarwal graciously for making the data available on his web-site 
http://www2.gsu.edu/~fncvaa. 
15 Refer to Agarwal, Gay, and Ling (2014) for the intuition behind and the methodology of constructing 
these proxies for window-dressing. 
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and growth and income. About sixty seven percent of fund-quarter observations come from 
growth funds. About eleven and twenty two percent of fund-quarter observations are dedicated to 
aggressive growth funds and growth and income funds, respectively. Panel B of Table 9 reports 
the results of these analyses. The heterogeneity in the strength of the relationships between return 
on innovation and stagnation and future fund alpha is mostly pronounced for funds with growth 
and aggressive growth objective styles. The obtained results can be a reflection of the nature of 
portfolio innovation across funds of various investment styles. For example, the data show that 
mutual funds with the aggressive growth strategy are the most active at introducing completely 
new equities into their portfolios. On average, a fund that follows an aggressive growth strategy 
allocates about 7% of portfolio to new additions. This constitutes about 13 new securities 
introduced to the portfolio each quarter. On the other hand, the portfolio innovation of an average 
fund with a growth and income style is 4%. Hence, the propensity of portfolio innovation across 
funds with various investment objectives can explain why the link between the return on 
innovation and future fund alpha is more pronounced among certain funds, but not others. 
Additionally, it is likely that the alpha of growth and income funds is generated differently from 
the alpha of aggressive growth funds. For example, such funds are likely to generate significant 
income from non-equity securities. The return on innovation measure is not equipped to capture 
such cash flows. 
5.6.3. Eliminating small funds 
The following set of analyses explores the effect of the return on innovation and 
stagnation on future fund alpha with respect to fund size. Smaller funds may have more capacity 
for absorbing fund inflows, and therefore, the relationship between the return on innovation and 
future alpha may be driven by the small size effect. To address this possibility, I rerun the main 
regression model specified in Equation (6) on the sub-sample of funds with greater than $300 
million in total net assets under management.  
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The results in Panel C of Table 9 indicate that the ability of the return on innovation to 
predict fund alpha is present in large funds, albeit with lesser statistical significance than in small 
funds. This result is consistent with the diminishing returns to scale argument discussed in 
literature. That is, a fund’s ability to outperform its benchmark decreases as it grows in size (Berk 
and Green (2004)). This occurs because larger funds have a greater impact on stock prices by 
placing larger trades, and therefore, eroding the fund’s abnormal performance. As a result, the 
extent to which the return on innovation can predict fund alpha is inversely related to fund size.  
5.6.4. Alternative identifications of new portfolio holdings 
A number of studies document the evidence suggesting that affiliated mutual funds 
functioning under the same management company (or fund family) can behave in a coordinated 
manner. For example, Morgan, Poulsen, Wolf, and Yang (2011) document that voting within 
fund families on management proposals is correlated. In addition, Bodnaruk, Massa, and 
Simonov (2009) document that financial conglomerates (including mutual funds) in which 
affiliated investment banks serve as advisors for bidders tend to increase their holdings in 
potential targets prior to M&A announcements. Moreover, analysts working for the management 
company of a fund may casually share their perspectives on potentially attractive investments. 
Overall, there are reasons to suspect that mutual funds may not necessarily exert a significant 
amount of effort in order to add a completely new equity to their portfolio, but rather obtain 
valuable information about a potential investment from their peers within the fund family. In an 
attempt to address this possibility, I redefine the portfolio innovation as the summation of 
portfolio weights of securities that are new not only to the fund, but also to the fund family. 
Similarly to the baseline analysis, I track the fund’s management family holdings over time to 
identify new additions that were never a part of portfolios of other funds within the family. On 
average, a fund manager allocates 2.3% of her portfolio to positions that are new to the family. 
After identifying new securities at the fund family level, I calculate the portfolio innovation and 
stagnation, following Equations (1) and (2), respectively. Using this alternative identification of 
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new additions, I estimate the return on innovation and stagnation consistently with Equations (3) 
through (5).16 
Panel D of Table 9 reports the results of the analysis with this alternative definition of 
portfolio innovation. Consistent with the earlier findings, it is the performance of new securities, 
and not the performance of other positions in a portfolio that strongly predicts the next-quarter 
risk-adjusted fund returns. Although informational flows across various entities within the fund 
management company may exist, the results in Panel D do not reject the conjecture that fund 
managers exert effort to bring new additions to their portfolios, and the reward for the success of 
doing so is reflected in the future fund alpha. 
In addition, Coval and Moskowitz (2001) document that mutual funds earn abnormal 
returns in geographically proximate investments. These results suggest that the nearby mutual 
funds may have informational advantages. The authors define the geographically proximate, or 
local, holdings as stocks located within a 100-kilometer radius from the fund headquarters. I 
explore whether my findings are driven by the performance of local stocks. To do so, I redefine 
new portfolio holdings excluding local stocks. As a result, the average portfolio weight allocated 
to new positions decreases from 5.98% to 5.68%. Using this alternative definition of new stocks, 
I rerun the regression model (6) and report the results in Panel E of Table 9. Overall, the results in 
Panel E indicate that the relationship between the return on innovation and the fund's abnormal 
performance is unlikely to be driven entirely by geographically proximate investments.  
For additional robustness, I disaggregate the portfolio holdings into seven groups of 
stocks: 1) initiations that do not appear in the list of previously reported holdings (portfolio 
innovation); 2) initiations of stocks previously held; 3) additions of stocks currently held; 4) 
positions held constant; 5) positions partially decreased; 6) fully liquidated positions previously 
held; and 7) fully liquidated positions held for the first time. Similarly to the baseline analysis, 
                                                            
16 For additional robustness, I also experiment by defining new holdings as ones that either have not been 
held before by a fund or have not been a part of the fund's portfolio for at least 5 years. The results are 
qualitatively similar and available upon request. 
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these groups of holdings are identified in quarter (t-1). Raw average unadjusted, market-adjusted, 
and DGTW-adjusted returns for each portion are measured in quarter t, and fund alpha is 
measured in quarter (t+1). Next, I rerun the regression model outlined by Eq. (6), including the 
returns on all seven decomposed portfolio portions.  
Table 10 reports the results. Comparing the effects of the unadjusted, market-adjusted, 
and DGTW-adjusted returns on all seven portfolio portions, the return on new holdings exhibits 
the strongest relationship with future fund alpha. The economic significance of these results is 
similar to that assessed earlier. Evaluating the effects of the returns on decomposed holdings 
suggests that the positive and significant relation between the return on new stocks and fund 
alpha is most likely to be driven by information. In contrast, since mutual funds may scale their 
positions up and down in response to flows, incremental portfolio changes are less likely to 
reflect superior information.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This study proposes a new approach to examine the value of active fund management. 
The method focuses on identifying fund portfolio positions on which managers are likely to exert 
more effort. Specifically, I examine completely new holdings (stocks) that a fund did not own 
before. There is a reason to believe that managers are likely to exert more effort to introduce 
completely new positions than to update their beliefs on existing holdings. To bring a completely 
new equity into a portfolio, managers are likely to conduct comprehensive research related to the 
new stock in order to justify a fund's exposure to this investment. More importantly, to assess the 
quality of effort exertion, I evaluate the return on new portfolio positions. This return is defined 
as “return on portfolio innovation.” 
I document that the return on innovation, and not the return on other securities in the 
portfolio, drives future fund abnormal performance. A standard-deviation increase in the return 
on innovation is associated with an increase in the Carhart (1997) four-factor alpha by about 0.33 
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to 0.50 percent annually. This relationship is mostly pronounced among smaller funds, and funds 
with aggressive growth and growth strategies. The results are robust with respect to identifying 
new fund holdings at the fund family level, as well as with respect to possible window-dressing 
behavior. Moreover, the analysis of persistence of the return on new holdings suggests that the 
link between the return on innovation and future fund alpha is short-lived. 
Finally, the proposed fund-alpha-predictive measure, the return on innovation, survives a 
horse-race with other documented measures of active management. When combined with Active 
Share, Industry Concentration Index, Fund R2, and Return Gap, return on portfolio innovation 
remains economically and statistically significant for predicting the next-quarter fund abnormal 
return. This suggests that the return on innovation captures information about managerial skill 
that other measures of active management do not. Overall, the quality of managerial effort 
reflected in the return on innovation is one of the channels through which the value of active 
management is generated. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics of all actively managed U.S. equity funds and their portfolios during 
1990-2011. The sample consists of 1,482 funds. Panel A presents fund characteristics. Panel B reports the 
characteristics of and returns on portfolio innovation, and Panel C provides statistics on the characteristics 
of and returns on portfolio stagnation. Panel D presents the characteristics of new and existing stocks in the 
portfolio. Each quarter, I calculate the cross-sectional average characteristics of new and existing positions 
of funds conditionally on adding new securities to the portfolio. It is worthwhile to note that a security can 
be new for some funds and existing for other funds. T-statistics are calculated based on a time-series of the 
cross-sectional averages. Variable descriptions are provided in the Appendix. Continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1% level. 
 
Panel A : Fund characteristics  
 Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
 
Age (years) 
 
13 
 
13 
 
5 
 
2 
 
30 
Expense ratio (%) 1.15 1.16 0.47 0.01 2.72 
Flows (%) -0.79 -2.07 9.50 -39.42 107.51 
TNA (millions) 1761 459 4318 17 57884 
Turnover (%) 75.91 58.00 68.26 0.31 560.39 
# of stocks in portfolio 116 75 194 11 3717 
# of new stocks in portfolio 11 6 13 0 174 
Portfolio return (%) 1.46 2.25 10.61 -44.27 75.65 
α (%) -0.15 -0.23 3.93 -26.31 29.26 
Total number of funds 1,482     
Panel B : Characteristics and returns on portfolio innovation 
 Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
 
Portfolio innovation (%) 
 
5.98 
 
3.79 
 
7.12 
 
0.00 
 
69.87 
Returns on innovation      
     Unadjusted (%) 0.14 0.03 1.83 -15.22 51.95 
     Market − adjusted (%) 0.13 0.01 1.32 -11.61 42.97 
     DGTW − adjusted (%) 0.01 0.00 0.90 -11.10 24.45 
Panel C : Characteristics and returns on portfolio stagnation 
 Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
 
Portfolio stagnation (%) 
 
94.02
 
96.21
 
7.25
 
30.13 
 
100 
Returns on stagnation      
     Unadjusted (%) 1.57 2.42 10.21 -40.52 73.87 
     Market − adjusted (%) 1.11 0.77 6.32 -44.49 58.84 
     DGTW − adjusted (%) -0.02 -0.003 4.69 -48.58 48.67 
Panel D : Characteristics of new and existing securities 
  
New 
 
Existing 
 
Difference 
  
Log(market cap) 22.26 21.84 0.42***   
t − statistic 
Log(assets) 
 
9.36 
 
8.93 
(33.44) 
0.74*** 
  
t − statistic 
Std in stock returns 
 
0.112 
 
0.126 
(22.34) 
-0.014*** 
  
t − statistic 
β 
 
1.14 
 
1.24 
(-22.83) 
-0.10*** 
  
t − statistic 
Market − to − book 
 
3.74 
 
3.86 
(-12.30) 
-0.12** 
  
t – statistic   (-2.06)   
      Symbols ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels, respectively.
Stock turnover (%) 
t − statistic 
0.208 0.262 -0.054*** 
 (-13.40) 
Raw return (%) 3.42 3.30 0.12
t − statistic 
Raw return per unit of portfolio weight
 
1.70
 
0.04
(0.34) 
1.66**
t − statistic (2.30)
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Table 2:  Portfolio innovation and future mutual fund performance 
 
This table reports the coefficients of quarterly panel regressions of the following form: 
 
ߙ௙,௧ାଵ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊	݋݊	݅݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݅݋݊௙,௧ ൅ ߚଶ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊	݋݊	ݏݐܽ݃݊ܽݐ݅݋݊௙,௧ ൅ 	߰	ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௙,௧ ൅	ߝ௙,௧ାଵ 
Panel A reports the estimation results of the above regression with a risk-adjusted return from the Carhart’s 
(1997) four-factor model as a dependent variable. Models (1) and (2) report regression results with 
measured unadjusted returns on innovation and stagnation. Models (3) and (4) report regression results with 
measured market-adjusted returns on innovation and stagnation. Models (5) and (6) report regression 
results with measured DGTW-adjusted returns on innovation and stagnation. Models (7) through (12) in 
Panel B incorporate conditional measures of fund abnormal performance following the approach of Ferson 
and Schadt (1996). Panel C reports the results of using raw equally-weighted (EW) returns on new and 
existing securities as the main variables of interest. Panel D presents the results of using raw value-
weighted (VW) returns on new and existing securities. Variable descriptions are provided in the Appendix. 
Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% level. All regressions include quarter fixed effects. Standard 
errors are clustered at the fund level and provided in parentheses. 
 
 
Panel A: Dependent variable - Carhart's (1997) four-factor αt+1  
Unadjusted Market-adjusted DGTW-adjusted 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Return on innovationt 0.042** 0.045** 0.089*** 0.094*** 0.121*** 0.121*** 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.030) (0.030) (0.036) (0.036) 
Return on stagnationt 0.003 0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.011 -0.011 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
Log(TNA)t -0.063*** -0.063*** -0.064*** 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) 
Log(Age)t 0.157** 0.161** 0.159** 
(0.066) (0.066) (0.066) 
Expense ratiot -0.201*** -0.199*** -0.201*** 
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057) 
Turnover ratiot -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Flowst 0.002 0.002 0.002 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Log(# of stocks in portfolios)t -0.101*** -0.101*** -0.101*** 
    (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Intercept -0.966*** -0.271 -0.966*** -0.281 -0.971*** -0.280 
(0.141) (0.284) (0.141) (0.284) (0.141) (0.285) 
Time-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes
R2 (%) 8.24 8.41 8.28 8.46 8.27 8.44 
# of observations 35,333 35,333 35,333 35,333 35,333 35,333 
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Panel B: Dependent variable - Conditional four-factor αt+1  
Unadjusted Market-adjusted DGTW-adjusted 
  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Return on innovationt 0.047** 0.040** 0.088*** 0.082*** 0.154*** 0.141*** 
(0.018) (0.017) (0.024) (0.024) (0.028) (0.028) 
Return on stagnationt 0.010** 0.006 0.006 0.001 0.015*** 0.009 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 
Log(TNA)t 0.070*** 0.071*** 0.069*** 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
Log(Age)t 0.017 0.021 0.017 
(0.067) (0.067) (0.067) 
Expense ratiot 0.074 0.074 0.075 
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) 
Turnover ratiot -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) 
Flowst 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Log(# of stocks in portfolios)t -0.153*** -0.153*** -0.151*** 
    (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) 
Intercept 0.121 0.441 0.336*** 0.558** 0.496*** 0.672*** 
(0.123) (0.288) (0.098) (0.278) (0.099) (0.278) 
Time-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes
R2 (%) 7.01 7.98 7.07 8.05 7.17 8.14 
# of observations 35,333 35,333 35,333 35,333 35,333 35,333 
Panel C: Dependent variable - Carhart's (1997) four-factor αt+1  
Unadjusted Market-adjusted DGTW-adjusted 
  (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
Raw return on new stockst (EW) 0.005** 0.005** 0.006** 0.006** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Raw return on old stockst (EW) -0.0009 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.013** -0.014*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Log(TNA)t -0.063*** -0.063*** -0.063*** 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Log(Age)t 0.157** 0.158** 0.161** 
(0.066) (0.066) (0.066) 
Expense ratiot -0.198*** -0.199*** -0.199*** 
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057) 
Turnover ratiot -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Flowst 0.002 0.002 0.003 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Log(# of stocks in portfolios)t -0.102*** -0.102*** -0.101*** 
  (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Intercept -0.963*** -0.264 -0.963*** -0.267 -0.971*** -0.287 
(0.141) (0.284) (0.141) (0.284) (0.141) (0.285) 
Time-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes
R2 (%) 8.23 8.39 8.23 8.40 8.26 8.43 
# of observations 35,333 35,333 35,333 35,333 35,333 35,333 
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Panel D: Dependent variable - Carhart's (1997) four-factor αt+1  
Unadjusted Market-adjusted DGTW-adjusted 
  (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
Raw return on new stockst (VW) 0.004 0.004 0.005* 0.005* 0.005* 0.005* 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Raw return on old stockst (VW) 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.0009 -0.011* -0.011* 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Log(TNA)t -0.062*** -0.062*** -0.061*** 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Log(Age)t 0.155** 0.156** 0.157** 
(0.067) (0.067) (0.067) 
Expense ratiot -0.169*** -0.169*** -0.169*** 
(0.062) (0.062) (0.063) 
Turnover ratiot -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Flowst 0.0004 0.0004 0.0008 
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0010) 
Log(# of stocks in portfolios)t -0.103*** -0.103*** -0.102*** 
  (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Intercept -0.953*** -0.282 -0.953*** -0.283 -0.961*** -0.302 
(0.143) (0.289) (0.143) (0.290) (0.144) (0.291) 
Time-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes
R2 (%) 7.26 7.42 7.27 7.42 7.27 7.42 
# of observations 35,333 35,333 35,333 35,333 35,333 35,333 
      Symbols ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels, respectively. 
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Table 3: The calendar-time regression approach 
 
This table examines the relation between the return on innovation and future fund abnormal performance 
using the calendar-time regression approach. In each quarter (t + 1), I sort all funds into deciles based on 
the return on innovation in quarter t. The lowest (highest) portfolio decile contains a set of funds with the 
lowest (highest) return on innovation. I then calculate equally-weighted returns for the funds in each decile. 
Next, I run calendar-time regressions of these quarterly fund returns in excess of a quarterly risk-free rate 
on the CAPM model, the Fama-French three-factor model, and the Carhart four-factor model. Quarterly 
returns on factor portfolios are obtained by compounding monthly returns. 
 
 
 
 
α4−factor (%) t-stat α3−factor 
(%)
t-stat αCAP M (%) t-stat 
 
Lowest 
 
-0.648* 
 
(-1.70) 
 
-0.679* 
 
(-1.83) 
 
-0.528 
 
(-1.46) 
2 0.110 (0.33) 0.092 (0.28) 0.107 (0.36) 
3 0.092 (0.34) 0.033 (0.12) 0.140 (0.57) 
4 0.249 (1.07) 0.267 (1.18) 0.356* (1.65) 
5 0.304 (1.47) 0.284 (1.41) 0.403** (1.97) 
6 0.248 (1.20) 0.232 (1.15) 0.380* (1.77) 
7 0.154 (0.71) 0.219 (1.02) 0.447* (1.91) 
8 0.281 (0.96) 0.356 (1.23) 0.608** (2.15) 
9 0.327 (1.00) 0.479 (1.42) 0.800** (2.45) 
Highest 0.892* (1.94) 1.094** (2.31) 1.589*** (3.19) 
Highest − Lowest 1.540** (2.57) 1.773*** (2.91) 2.117*** (3.72) 
 
       Symbols ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels, respectively. 
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Table 4: Determinants of portfolio innovation 
 
This table reports the coefficients of quarterly panel regressions of the determinants for portfolio innovation. The dependent variable in models (1) 
through (8) is the next-quarter portfolio innovation. Models (3) and (4) report regression results with measured unadjusted returns on innovation and 
stagnation. Models (5) and (6) report regression results with measured market-adjusted returns on innovation and stagnation. Models (7) and (8) report 
regression results with measured DGTW-adjusted returns on innovation and stagnation. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. Continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1% level. All regressions include quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level and provided in 
parentheses. 
 
Unadjusted  Market-adjusted DGTW-adjusted 
OLS Tobit OLS Tobit OLS Tobit OLS Tobit 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
 
Return on innovationt 8.663*** 8.668*** 18.225*** 18.334*** 4.067 4.177 
(2.975) (2.677) (4.222) (3.541) (5.927) (5.008) 
Return on stagnationt -1.419** -1.431** -2.210*** -2.235*** -1.597* -1.482 
(0.657) (0.694) (0.663)  (0.720) (0.937) (0.972) 
P ortfolio innovationt 0.372*** 0.388*** 0.371*** 0.386*** 0.371*** 0.386*** 0.372*** 0.387*** 
(0.026) (0.006)  (0.026) (0.006) (0.026) (0.006)  (0.026) (0.006) 
P ortfolio returnt -0.327 -0.189 
(0.786) (0.778) 
Log(T NA)t -0.329*** -0.339*** -0.329*** -0.339*** -0.329*** -0.339*** -0.329*** -0.338*** 
(0.045)  (0.028)  (0.044) (0.028) (0.045)  (0.028)  (0.045) (0.028) 
Log(Age)t -1.114*** -1.171*** -1.113*** -1.170*** -1.108*** -1.166*** -1.113*** -1.171*** 
(0.202)  (0.117)  (0.202) (0.117) (0.202)  (0.117)  (0.202) (0.117) 
Expense ratiot 6.100 5.967 6.129 6.007 6.406 6.297 5.936 5.815 
(15.981) (9.666) (15.976) (9.665) (15.966) (9.662) (15.985) (9.666) 
T urnover ratiot 2.009*** 2.184*** 2.002*** 2.177*** 1.997*** 2.172*** 2.011*** 2.186*** 
(0.154) (0.066)  (0.153) (0.066) (0.153) (0.065)  (0.154) (0.066) 
F lowst -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
(0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004) 
#of stocks in portfoliot -0.327*** 0.018 -0.374*** 0.017 -0.377*** 0.014 -0.374*** 0.017 
(0.081) (0.055) (0.081) (0.056) (0.081) (0.056) (0.081) (0.056) 
Aggressive growth fund dummy 0.759*** 0.839*** 0.759*** 0.841*** 0.758*** 0.839*** 0.758*** 0.839*** 
(0.245) (0.144)  (0.244) (0.144) (0.244) (0.144)  (0.245) (0.144) 
Growth fund dummy 0.451*** 0.470*** 0.450*** 0.470*** 0.448*** 0.468*** 0.449*** 0.469*** 
(0.128) (0.098)  (0.128) (0.098) (0.128) (0.098)  (0.128) (0.098) 
Intercept 7.306*** 4.960*** 7.319*** 4.973*** 7.324*** 4.978*** 7.309*** 4.962*** 
(0.783) (0.540)  (0.781) (0.540) (0.781) (0.539)  (0.783) (0.540) 
T ime − fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2(%) 28.01 28.01 28.04 28.04 28.08 28.08 28.01 28.01 
# of observations 31,325 31,325 31,325 31,325 31,325 31,325 31,325 31,325 
Symbols ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels, respectively. 
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Table 5: Mutual fund characteristics and performance of new additions 
 
This table presents the determinants of the return on new positions conditionally on adding new stocks to 
the portfolio: 
ܴܽݓ	ݎ݁ݐݑݎ݊	݋݊	݊݁ݓ	ݏݐ݋ܿ݇ݏ௙,௧ାଵ
ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ	ܲ݋ݎݐ݂݋݈݅݋	݅݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݅݋݊௙,௧ ൅ 	ߚଶ	ܴܽݓ	ݎ݁ݐݑݎ݊	݋݊	݊݁ݓ	ݏݐ݋ܿ݇ݏ௙,௧
൅ 	߰	ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௙,௧ ൅	ߝ௙,௧ାଵ 
The dependent variable is the raw return (equally-weighted or value-weighted) on new portfolio additions 
measured over quarter (t + 1). Columns labeled with odd numbers present the results with equally-weighted 
(EW) raw returns on new stocks, and columns labeled with even numbers report the results with value-
weighted (VW) raw returns. Controls definitions are provided in the Appendix. Continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1% level. All regressions include quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the 
fund level and provided in parentheses. 
 
Unadjusted Market-adjusted DGTW-adjusted 
EW VW EW VW EW VW 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Portfolio innovationt 2.697*** 2.767*** 2.112** 2.181** 0.495 0.813 
(0.984) (1.034) (0.967) (1.020) (0.899) (0.976) 
Raw return on new stockst -0.036*** -0.026*** -0.033*** -0.023*** -0.058*** -0.043*** 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
Log(TNA)t -0.108** -0.110** -0.113** -0.114** -0.021 -0.015 
(0.046) (0.047) (0.044) (0.046) (0.044) (0.045) 
Log(Age)t 0.069 0.044 0.051 0.026 0.020 0.154 
(0.201) (0.198) (0.197) (0.195) (0.186) (0.194) 
Expense ratiot -10.739 3.952 -7.709 6.938 8.470 15.824 
(15.913) (16.358) (15.599) (16.189) (15.797) (16.679) 
Turnover ratiot -0.142 -0.137 -0.124 -0.119 -0.091 -0.090 
(0.106) (0.111) (0.104) (0.109) (0.098) (0.104) 
Flowst 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.005 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Quarterly returnt 0.055*** 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.049*** 0.077*** 0.071*** 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) 
Aggressive growth fund dummy 0.338 0.196 0.270 0.128 0.346 0.249 
(0.254) (0.254) (0.248) (0.250) (0.255) (0.265) 
Growth fund dummy 0.334** 0.291* 0.295** 0.252 0.279* 0.289* 
(0.158) (0.161) (0.151) (0.156) (0.148) (0.156) 
Intercept 10.133*** 10.542*** 0.891 1.147 -0.478 -0.929 
(0.793) (0.797) (0.739) (0.751) (0.742) (0.783) 
Time-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes
R2 (%) 39.88 37.96 6.31 5.97 6.28 6.26 
# of observations 33,586 33,586 33,586 33,586 33,586 33,586      Symbols ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels, respectively. 
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Table 6: Predicting mutual fund performance with other measures of active management 
 
This table reports the results of regressions relating fund α, the return on innovation and stagnation, and other measures of active management 
documented in the literature. The dependent variable is a risk-adjusted return from the Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model. It is a cumulative return over 
quarter t + 1. The independent variables are measured as of quarter t. The measure of active portfolio management, Active Share, is documented in 
Cremers and Petajisto (2009) and is borrowed from Petajisto’s web-site for the purposes of this study. Industry Concentration Index is calculated 
following Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005). Fund R2 is obtained from a regression of its returns net of expenses on a four-factor model, as 
suggested by Amihud and Goyenko (2013). Return Gap proxies for unobserved actions of mutual funds, as in Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2008). 
The control variables include fund flows, the natural logarithm of age, expense ratio, turnover ratio, the log of net assets under management, and the log 
of a number of stocks in portfolio. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% level. All regressions include quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered at the fund level and provided in parentheses. 
 
Dependent variable - Carhart's (1997) four-factor αt+1    
   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Return on innovationt 0.11** 0.12*** 0.12***  0.11*** 0.10** 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.04) (0.04) 
Return on stagnationt -0.0060 -0.011 -0.012*  -0.011 -0.004 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007)  (0.008) (0.008) 
Active Share 0.42** 0.73***   0.56*** 
(0.13) (0.15)   (0.19) 
Industry Concentration Index 1.21*** 1.25***   -0.37 
(0.18) (0.22)   (0.92) 
Fund R2 -2.11*** -2.29***   -1.71** 
(0.25) (0.22)   (0.69) 
Return Gap 21.19** 20.36** 21.98* 
(8.94) (9.17) (12.71) 
Intercept -1.20*** -1.44*** -1.10*** -0.59** 1.01*** 1.44*** -0.87*** 0.31 0.15 
(0.15) (0.33) (0.14) (0.28) (0.28) (0.34) (0.17) (0.51) (0.78) 
   
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 
Time-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 (%) 11.41 11.68 8.72 8.73 8.59 8.84 8.49 8.69 11.90 
# of observations 22,525 22,525 34,246 34,246 35,435 35,435 32,576 32,576 21,342 
            Symbols ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels, respectively. 
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Table 7: The persistence of the return on new holdings 
 
This table examines the persistence of the return on new stocks.  This analysis is performed 
conditionally on initiating new positions. More specifically, fund-quarter observations are removed if a 
fund does not introduce a new stock to the portfolio in a given quarter. In each quarter t, I sort all funds into 
quintiles based on the raw average return on new positions. The lowest (highest) portfolio quintile contains 
a set of funds with the lowest (highest) return on new holdings. I then calculate equally-weighted returns on 
new positions for the funds in each quintile during the subsequent six quarters. T − statistics are obtained 
from  the  cross-sectional  average  differences  between  the  lowest  and  highest  quintile  returns. 
 
 
Quintiles 
 
(t + 1) 
 
(t + 2) 
 
(t + 3) 
 
(t + 4) 
 
(t + 5) 
 
(t + 6) 
 
Lowest 
 
2.76% 
 
1.53% 
 
2.01% 
 
2.14% 
 
1.21% 
 
1.44% 
2 2.46% 1.62% 2.29% 2.24% 1.63% 1.23% 
3 1.95% 2.09% 1.91% 1.76% 1.52% 1.28% 
4 1.98% 2.37% 1.90% 1.73% 1.44% 1.45% 
Highest 1.13% 2.45% 1.74% 1.25% 0.91% 1.95% 
Highest − Lowest -1.63% 0.92% -0.27% -0.89% -0.30% 0.51% 
T − statistics (-1.18) (1.02) (-0.40) (-1.18) (-0.39) (0.83)
 
Symbols ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels, respectively. 
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Table 8: Portfolio innovation and future mutual fund flows 
 
This table reports the coefficients of quarterly panel regressions of the following form: 
 
ܨ݈݋ݓݏ௙,௧ାଵ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ	ܲ݋ݎݐ݂݋݈݅݋	݅݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݅݋݊௙,௧ ൅ 	ߚଶ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊	݋݊	݅݊݊݋ݒܽݐ݅݋ ௙݊,௧
൅ ߚଷ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊	݋݊	ݏݐܽ݃݊ܽݐ݅݋݊௙,௧ ൅ 	߰	ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௙,௧ ൅	ߝ௙,௧ାଵ 
The dependent variable is the quarterly growth rate (%) of assets under management after adjusting for the 
appreciation of the fund’s assets. Models (3) and  (4)  report  regression  results  with  measured  
unadjusted returns on innovation and stagnation. Models (5) and (6)  report  regression  results  with  
measured  market- adjusted returns on innovation and stagnation. Models (7) and (8) report regression 
results with measured DGTW-adjusted returns on innovation and stagnation. Variable descriptions are 
provided in the Appendix. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% level. All regressions include 
quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level and provided in parentheses. 
 
 Dependent variable: Future fund flows 
  Unadjusted Market-adjusted DGTW-adjusted 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Return on innovationt 
  27.86*** 21.96*** 42.15*** 36.69*** 52.76*** 42.98*** 
  (5.43) (5.48) (7.69) (7.62) (9.96) (9.61) 
Return on stagnationt 
  19.47*** 12.77*** 18.12*** 11.39*** 19.83*** 11.22*** 
  (1.22) (1.15) (1.23) (1.18) (1.83) (1.66) 
Portfolio innovationt 
  -0.22 0.99 -0.38 0.86 0.14 1.29 
  (1.23) (1.24) (1.24) (1.24) (1.25) (1.24) 
Portfolio returnt 
34.12*** 27.96*** 
(1.55) (1.59) 
α4−factor t  14.23*** 26.79*** 26.79*** 30.84*** 
 (1.94) (1.90) (1.90) (1.92) 
Log(TNA)t 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Log(Age)t -0.51* -0.51* -0.49* -0.48* -0.49* 
(0.27) (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) 
Expense ratiot 14.31 16.86 18.67 19.26 23.64 
(21.47) (21.42) (21.67) (21.67) (21.78) 
Turnover ratiot 0.15 0.15 0.11 0.09 0.11 
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Std returnt -19.13*** -18.27*** -18.6*** -18.9***  -18.6*** 
(5.27) (5.23) (5.32) (5.32) (5.35) 
Log(# of stocks in portfolios)t 0.001* 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001*** 
  (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Intercept -0.42 -0.44 -1.65*** -0.45 -1.68*** -0.46 -1.72*** -0.53 
(0.86) (0.85) (0.26) (0.87) (0.27) (0.87) (0.26) (0.88) 
  
Time-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2 (%) 5.59 5.82 3.80 5.04 3.86 5.09 3.05 4.72 
# of observations 31,326 31,326 31,326 31,326 31,326 31,326 31,326 31,326 
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Table 9: Robustness 
 
This table reports the results for a set of robustness tests. The dependent variable in all regressions in each panel is a risk-adjusted return from the 
Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model. Panel A analyzes the effect of the return on innovation and stagnation on future fund alpha controlling for the 
window dressing activity of fund managers. The two window dressing proxies, Backward Holding Return Gap and Rank Gap, are constructed as in 
Agarwal, Gay, and Ling (2014).  Panel B reports the results of the main regression outlined in Equation (6) by mutual fund investment objective styles 
as indicated in the Thomson Financial database: aggressive growth, growth, and growth and income. Panel C shows the robustness of results with 
respect to fund size. Mutual funds with less than $300 million in total net assets are eliminated to run the regression model expressed in Equation (6). 
For additional robustness, new stocks are alternatively identified by tracking fund family holdings. Panel D reports the results of the regression 
described by Equation (6) with this alternative definition of new portfolio holdings identified at the fund family level. Panel E contains results of 
identifying new positions excluding local stocks. The unadjusted (Unadj.), market-adjusted (Mkt-adj.), and DGTW-adjusted (DGTW-adj.) performance 
of new and existing holdings are measured as in Equations (3), (4), and (5), respectively. The independent variables are measured as of quarter t. The 
control variables include fund flows, the natural logarithm of age, expense ratio, turnover ratio, the log of net assets under management, the log of a 
number of stocks in portfolio, and portfolio innovation. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% level. All regressions include quarter fixed 
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level and provided in parentheses. 
 
 
Panel A : Window dressing 
Dependent variable - Carhart’s (1997) four-factor αt+1 
Unadj. Mkt-adj. DGTW-adj. 
   
 
Return on innovationt 0.067** 0.064** 0.123*** 0.120*** 0.147*** 0.143*** 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.041) (0.041)  (0.045) (0.045) 
Return on stagnationt -0.009 -0.010 -0.012 -0.013 -0.027*** -0.028*** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
BHRG10% Dummyt -0.374*** -0.375*** -0.372*** 
(0.101) (0.101) (0.101) 
Rank Gap10% Dummyt -0.123 -0.114 -0.137 
(0.092) (0.092) (0.091) 
Intercept 2.002** 1.960** 2.105*** 2.081*** 2.103** 2.089*** 
(0.429) (0.429) (0.400) (0.401) (0.399) (0.400) 
Controls Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time − fixed effects Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2(%) 9.63 9.56 9.68 9.62 9.70   9.64 
# of observations 22,366 22,366 22,366 22,366 22,366 22,366 
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Table 9 – Continued 
 
 
 
Panel B : Investment objective style 
Dependent variable - Carhart’s (1997) four-factor αt+1 
 
 
Aggressive Growth   Growth   Growth and Income  
Unadj. Mkt-adj. DGTW-adj. Unadj. Mkt-adj. DGTW-adj. Unadj. Mkt-adj. DGTW-adj. 
 
Return on innovationt 0.145***     0.224***        0.305***         0.034         0.066* 0.088**         -0.080*         0.058 0.012 
(0.056) (0.075) (0.097) (0.025) (0.034) (0.039) (0.049) (0.078) (0.104) 
Return on stagnationt -0.024         -0.032*         -0.057***         0.003        -0.0004 -0.011          0.024**        0.014 0.022* 
(0.016) (0.017) (0.022) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
Intercept -0.990         -0.986 -0.983 0.032         0.026 0.021 -0.469        -0.462 -0.454 
(0.870) (0.870) (0.872) (0.368) (0.369) (0.369) (0.484) (0.487) (0.488) 
 
Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time − fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2(%) 20.47 20.57 20.68 8.84 8.86 8.86 8.56 8.49 8.46 
# of observations 3,893 3,893 3,893 23,542        23,542 23,542 7,898 7,898 7,898 
 
 
 
Panel C : Eliminating funds with less than $300 million in total net assets 
Dependent variable - Carhart’s (1997) four-factor αt+1 
 
 
Unadj. Mkt-adj. DGTW-adj. 
   
 
Return on innovationt 0.055* 0.088** 0.147*** 
(0.033) (0.044) (0.053) 
Return on stagnationt -0.002 -0.004 -0.021** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Intercept -0.434 -0.435 -0.451 
(0.384) (0.385) (0.385) 
 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Time − fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
R2(%) 9.85 9.88 9.92 
# of observations 21,267 21,267 21,267 
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Table 9 – Continued 
 
 
 
Panel D : New buys identification at the fund family level 
Dependent variable - Carhart’s (1997) four-factor αt+1 
 
 
Unadj. Mkt-adj. DGTW-adj. 
   
 
Return on innovationt 0.109*** 0.216*** 0.253*** 
(0.040) (0.054) (0.069) 
Return on stagnationt 0.002 -0.001 -0.008 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Intercept -0.197 -0.201 -0.215 
(0.288) (0.289) (0.289) 
 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Time − fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
R2(%) 8.51 8.59 8.53 
# of observations 35,122 35,122 35,122 
Panel E : New positions are identified excluding local stocks 
Dependent variable - Carhart’s (1997) four-factor αt+1 
Unadj. Mkt-adj. DGTW-adj. 
   
 
Return on innovationt 0.042* 0.088*** 0.116*** 
(0.022) (0.031) (0.037) 
Return on stagnationt 0.003 -0.0007 -0.010 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Intercept -0.179 -0.181 -0.188 
(0.287) (0.288) (0.288) 
 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Time − fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
R2(%) 8.43 8.45 8.45 
# of observations 35,333 35,333 35,333 
Symbols ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels, respectively. 
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Table 10: The performance of decomposed holdings and future fund alpha 
 
This table reports the results of the relation between the returns on decomposed portfolio holdings and 
future fund alpha. I disaggregate the portfolio holdings into seven groups of stocks: 1) initiations that do 
not appear in the list of previously reported holdings (portfolio innovation); 2) initiations of stocks 
previously held; 3) additions of stocks currently held; 4) positions held constant; 5) positions partially 
decreased; 6) fully liquidated positions previously held; and 7) fully liquidated positions held for the first 
time. Similarly to the baseline analysis, these groups of holdings are identified in quarter (t − 1). Raw 
average unadjusted, market-adjusted, and DGTW-adjusted returns for each portion are measured in quarter 
t, and fund alpha is measured in quarter (t + 1). Next, I rerun the regression model outlined by Eq. (6), 
including the returns on all seven decomposed portfolio portions. Variable descriptions are provided in the 
Appendix. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% level. All regressions include quarter fixed 
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level and provided in parentheses. 
 
 
 
Dependent variable - Carhart’s (1997) four-factor αt+1 
Unadjusted Market-adjusted DGTW-adjusted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 
Return on initiations of stocks never heldt 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.007** 0.007** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Return on initiations of stocks 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.002 
previously heldt (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Return on additions of stocks 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.001 
currently heldt (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
 
Return on positions held constantt 0.008** 0.007* 0.013** 0.012** -0.000 -0.0002 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
 
Return on positions partially decreasedt -0.009* -0.009** -0.003 -0.003 -0.009** -0.009** 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
 
Return on fully liquidated -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0006 
positions previously heldt (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 
Return on fully liquidated positions 0.001 0.0007 0.0005 0.0004 0.002 0.002 
held for the first timet (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
 
Intercept -0.009*** -0.004 -0.009*** -0.004 -0.009*** -0.004 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes 
T ime − fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2  (%) 8.41 8.54 8.48 8.60 8.35 8.47 
# of observations 35,283 35,283 35,283 35,283 35,283 35,283 
Symbols ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels, respectively. 
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CHAPTER 2: INSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY-TYPE HERDING IN REAL ESTATE 
INVESTMENT TRUSTS* 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 
This study examines whether institutional investors exhibit herding behavior by property 
type in real estate investment trusts (REITs). Our analysis of changes in institutional portfolio 
holdings indicates strong evidence of this behavior. We analyze the autocorrelation in aggregate 
institutional demand, and find that most of it is driven by institutional investors following the 
trades of others. This herding occurs at the property-type level, and not at the individual firm 
level. Although momentum trading explains a small amount of this herding, institutional 
property-type demand is more strongly associated with lagged demand than lagged returns. The 
results suggest that correlated information signals drive herding in REITs. In addition, we 
examine the extent to which herding in REIT property types affects price performance in the 
private real estate market. We find that information transmission resulting from institutional 
herding in REITs occurs faster in public real estate markets than in private markets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* This essay is coauthored with Edward Nelling, Professor of Finance at Drexel University. We thank Kent 
Baker, Nicole Choi, an anonymous referee, as well as seminar participants at the Southern Finance 
Association 2013 meeting and the Financial Management Association 2014 meeting for their helpful 
comments and suggestions. 
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1. Introduction 
This study examines herding by institutional investors in real estate investment trusts 
(REITs). Herding is usually interpreted as the tendency of investors to behave in a similar or 
coordinated manner. It may arise due to investors reacting to common information, reputational 
concerns by portfolio managers, or positive feedback trading. From a behavioral perspective, 
researchers such as Shiller (2005) attribute herding to the collective irrationality of investors, 
which can result in the mispricing of economic fundamentals. Within the context of asset pricing, 
mispricing due to herding can cause price momentum and excess volatility, as noted by Nofsinger 
and Sias (1999). 
Herding in REITs is of interest for three main reasons. First, institutional investment in 
REITs has increased dramatically since the early 1990s, which is often referred to as the 
“modern” REIT era. This increase was facilitated by the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, 
which made it easier for institutions to make significant investments in REITs. The increased 
presence of institutions and the associated increase in investment companies (including real estate 
mutual funds) that specialize in REITs may have elevated reputational concerns by portfolio 
managers. It may have also increased information production by analysts, and thus increased the 
ability of investors to react similarly. 
Second, REITs have unique characteristics regarding income sources and dividend 
distributions, and exhibit return behavior that is different from that observed in equities in the 
broader stock market, as documented by Anderson, Boney, and Guirguis (2012) and Zhou and 
Anderson (2012). As a result, the evidence on herding in the general equity markets may not 
apply to REITs. From an investment perspective, understanding when and how herding in REITs 
occurs may help identify profitable investment opportunities. In addition, researchers have found 
evidence of momentum in REIT trading, which may be driven by herding. Ling and Naranjo 
(2003) report a positive association between REIT equity flows (i.e., the purchase of REIT shares 
during seasoned equity offerings) and prior returns, suggesting that REIT investors may follow 
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momentum strategies. However, this behavior is limited to the pre-1993 time period. They note 
that, since 1993 returns do not affect flows, but flows affect subsequent REIT returns. In a related 
study, Ling and Naranjo (2006) examine REIT mutual funds, and find that fund flows are 
positively related to past returns, suggesting that REIT mutual fund investors may engage in 
momentum trading strategies. 
Third, the existing literature on herding in REITs is sparse. To the best of our knowledge, the 
only two published studies on the topic are Zhou and Anderson (2013) and Ro and Gallimore 
(2014). Zhou and Anderson (2013) use the return-based approach of Chang, Cheng, and Khorana 
(2000) to examine the phenomenon at the market-wide level. The authors find evidence of 
herding in REITs, and that it is more likely to occur in declining markets than in rising markets. 
In addition, they find that REIT investors are more likely to herd in periods of high market 
volatility. They suggest that the structural developments in the REIT market have made 
“investors more responsive to market sentiment.” Their results document when herding in REITs 
is likely to occur. Our research complements theirs, in that the focus of our study is on 
institutional portfolio holdings, to provide insights as to how herding in REITs takes place.  
Ro and Gallimore (2014) use the herding measure developed by Lakonishok, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1992) to analyze trading by 159 real estate mutual funds (REMFs). They find evidence 
of herding in REITs, albeit at a lower level than for other stocks. The implication of this finding is 
that REITs appear to be relatively more transparent than other firms. In addition, the authors note 
that fund performance is inversely related to fund herding. They also find that herding in REITs is 
consistent with a disposition effect, in which portfolio managers tend to sell stocks that have 
posted gains, while continuing to hold stocks that have posted losses. These results are suggestive 
of herding, but focusing on REMFs may not fully capture the extent to which institutional herding 
occurs and impacts REIT returns. In our sample, we use a larger and broader segment of 
investors, including banks, pension funds, mutual funds, and insurance companies: on average, 
1,697 institutions are trading in a given quarter. 
49  
Our examination of herding behavior in REITs is at the property-type level. Other studies 
provide evidence that REIT fundamentals differ across property types. Gyourko and Nelling 
(1996) document that the systematic risk of equity REITs varies by property type, which may 
cause investors to move in and out of property types based on their anticipation of future market 
conditions. Patterson (2009) analyzes reactions of REIT returns to changes in economic risk 
factors, and finds substantial differences across property types. Chiang (2010) notes that 
increased institutional investment in REITs has resulted in information transfers that have 
increased the correlation of firm-level prices and property-type common information. Based on 
the existing evidence, we expect that if herding in REITs does exist, it is likely to occur at the 
property-type level. We believe that our analysis aligns well with the market-wide focus of Zhou 
and Anderson (2013) and the focus of Ro and Gallimore (2014) on individual REITs. 
We find significant evidence of herding in REIT property types by institutional investors. We 
measure buying demand for each property type in each quarter. Demand is strongly and 
positively correlated over consecutive quarters, and approximately 75% of this correlation is due 
to institutional investors following the lagged trades of others. Although institutional investors 
tend to follow their own lagged trades into the same stocks, they are more likely to follow lagged 
trades of other institutions in different stocks in the same property type. This suggests that herding 
behavior among REIT investors appears to be at the property-type level, rather than at the 
individual stock level. 
We use portfolio holdings and the approach of Choi and Sias (2009) to examine institutional 
property-type herding in REITs. In contrast to the return-based approach, the holdings-based 
measure directly estimates the degree of correlated trading in demand. This measure decomposes 
the autocorrelation in demand into a component due to institutional investors following their own 
trades, and another component arising from institutional investors following the trades of others. 
We find that REIT investors are positive-feedback traders, but momentum trading is not the 
primary source of property-type herding. On a related note, we find that property-type momentum 
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strategies are not profitable. We also examine returns around changes in demand and find no 
evidence of return reversals, which suggests that correlated information signals are likely to drive 
herding in REITs. 
We use the NCREIF Transaction Based Index (TBI) to measure the extent to which price 
effects of herding in REIT property types are reflected in the private real estate market. We find 
that the change in institutional demand appears to convey information to market participants. 
However, this information is reflected in prices quickly in public real estate markets, while it 
persists for longer periods in private markets. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The data and methodology are discussed 
in the next section. We document the results of tests for institutional property-type herding in 
Section 3. A summary is presented in the final section. 
 
2. Data and methodology 
We obtain data for this study from three resources. Data on prices and returns for equity 
REITs come from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP). REIT property-type 
classifications come from NAREIT. All institutional investors with at least $100 million under 
management are required to report to the Securities and Exchange Commission their equity 
positions greater than either 10,000 shares or $200,000 in market value. We obtain quarterly 
changes in holdings of institutional investors for each REIT from the 13(f) report database 
maintained by Thomson Financial. Our sample consists of all institutional holdings reported 
during the period of the first quarter of 1993 through the last quarter of 2011 (a total of 76 
quarters). This particular time period is specifically chosen to capture the impact of the Revenue 
Reconciliation Act of 1993 that has driven the potential to change the investment clientele within 
REITs. By establishing a “look-through” provision, this act has made investments in REITs more 
attractive to institutional investors. Chan, Leung, and Wang (1998) report that institutional 
ownership in REITs ranges from 12% to 14% between 1986 and 1992 and has increased to 17% 
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in 1993, 26% in 1994, and 30% in 1995. In light of the increase in institutional ownership in real 
estate equity immediately after such tax legislation, examining investors behavior across different 
REIT property types during this time period is particularly interesting. 
We classify managers as buyers or sellers in property type k in quarter t based on the product 
of prices at the beginning of the quarter and change in holdings held by a manager n at the end of 
the quarter. A manager n is considered a buyer in the REIT property type k if: 
 
	෍ ௜ܲ,௧ିଵሺܪ݋݈݀݅݊݃ݏ௡,௜,௧ െ ܪ݋݈݀݅݊݃ݏ௡,௜,௧ିଵ
ூೖ,೟
௜ୀଵ
ሻ ൐ 0 
 
 
(1) 
where ܫ௞,௧	is the number of securities in the REIT property type k in quarter t, ௜ܲ,௧ିଵ is the price of 
the REIT security at the beginning of quarter t, and ܪ݋݈݀݅݊݃ݏ௡,௜,௧ିଵ and ܪ݋݈݀݅݊݃ݏ௡,௜,௧		are the 
number of shares of the REIT security i held by an institutional investor n at the beginning and 
end of quarter t. Similarly, an institutional investor is defined as a seller in the REIT property type 
k in quarter t if the term on the left side of Equation (1) is negative. We further define institutional 
property-type demand (Δk,t) as the number of institutional investors buying the REIT property 
type k in quarter t as a fraction of the total number of institutional traders in property type k in 
quarter t: 
 	߂௞,௧ ൌ 	 # ܾݑݕ݁ݎݏ ݋݂ ݌ݎ݋݌݁ݎݐݕ ݐݕ݌݁ ݇ ݅݊ ݍݑܽݎݐ݁ݎ ݐ#	ܾݑݕ݁ݎݏ	݋݂	݌ݎ݋݌݁ݎݐݕ	ݐݕ݌݁ ݇ ݅݊ ݍݑܽݎݐ݁ݎ ݐ ൅ # ݏ݈݈݁݁ݎݏ ݋݂ ݌ݎ݋݌݁ݎݐݕ ݐݕ݌݁	݇	݅݊	ݍݑܽݎݐ݁ݎ ݐ 
 
 
(2) 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of our sample. On average, 1697 institutional 
investors trade individual REITs each quarter (varying from 844 to 2899) over the chosen time 
period. By comparison, Ro and Gallimore (2014) examine herding in a sample of 159 real estate 
mutual funds. The average institutional property-type demand in our sample is 50.17% with a 
very small standard deviation of 1.43%, indicating that, on average, the number of buyers does 
not substantially differ from the number of sellers in the market for REITs. Panel B reports that, 
on average, the property type constitutes about 14% of the total REIT market capitalization, and 
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the largest company in the property type accounts for about 28% of the property-type 
capitalization. Panel C illustrates time-series summary statistics for all seven REIT property 
types, including the average number of companies in the REIT property type, the property type’s 
market capitalization weight, the mean, and standard deviation of institutional property-type 
demand. Panel C also shows the total number of firms in a property type (varying from a 
minimum of 19 in Healthcare to a maximum of 64 in Retail). 
 
3. Institutional herding tests 
3.1. Correlation between current and lag property-type demand 
Our tests for institutional herding are based on Choi and Sias (2009). They suggest that the 
herding behavior of institutional investors can be inferred from the cross-sectional correlation 
between investors’ demand for securities in a given industry in quarter t and quarter t. Using 49 
Fama and French industries over the period of 1983 to 2005, they find strong evidence of 
institutional industry herding. We follow their approach, using REIT property types instead of 
industries. We partition the correlation between REIT property-type demand this quarter and last 
quarter as follows (see Choi and Sias (2009) for proof): 
 
	ߩሺ߂௞,௧,	߂௞,௧ିଵሻ ൌ 	 1ሺܭ െ 1ሻߪሺ߂௞,௧ሻߪሺ߂௞,௧ିଵሻ෍෍ቆ
ܦ௡,௞,௧ െ ̅߂௞,௧
௞ܰ,௧
ቇ ൈ ሺܦ௡,௞,௧ିଵ െ ̅߂௞,௧ିଵ
௞ܰ,௧ିଵ
ሻ
ேೖ,೟
௡ୀଵ
௄
௞ୀଵ
൅	 1ሺܭ െ 1ሻߪሺ߂௞,௧ሻߪሺ߂௞,௧ିଵሻ෍෍ ෍ ሺ
ேೖ,೟షభ
௠ୀଵ,௠ஷ௡
ܦ௡,௞,௧ െ ̅߂௞,௧
௞ܰ,௧
ሻ ൈ ሺܦ௠,௞,௧ିଵ െ ̅߂௞,௧ିଵ
௞ܰ,௧ିଵ
ሻ
ேೖ,೟
௡ୀଵ
௄
௞ୀଵ
 
 
 
(3) 
 
where K is the number of REIT property types (seven), Nk,t is the number of institutions trading 
property type k in quarter t, ߪሺ߂௞,௧ሻ and ̅߂௞,௧ are the cross-sectional standard deviation and average 
institutional demand in quarter t, respectively, ܦ௡,௞,௧ equals one if institution n purchases the REIT 
property type k in quarter t and zero if institution n sells the REIT property type i in quarter t. In 
Eq. (3), the cross-sectional correlation between institutional investors’ property-type demand this 
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quarter and last quarter is partitioned into two components: the first term is a portion of the 
correlation that arises from institutional investors following their own lagged demand for property 
type k and the second component arises from institutional investors following other institutional 
investors’ lagged demand for property type k. 
There are several reasons why a positive correlation between institutional REIT property-
type demand this quarter and last quarter may be detected. For instance, a positive correlation 
may originate when one institutional investor purchases (sells), say, Retail REITs in both quarter t 
and quarter t-1. Furthermore, a positive correlation may also arise when one institutional investor 
buys (sells) Retail REITs this quarter, and other institutional investors purchased (sold) them last 
quarter. Panel A of Table 2 reports the time-series average cross-sectional correlation coefficient 
between institutional REIT property-type demand this quarter and last quarter. The average 
correlation coefficient of 0.5359, statistically significant at the 1% level, indicates that there is a 
strong correlation between institutional REIT property-type demand in quarter t and quarter t-1. 
The second and third columns of Panel A in Table 2 indicate the portion of the correlation 
coefficient attributed to institutional investors following their own REIT property-type demand 
(0.1337) and the portion of the correlation coefficient attributed to institutional investors 
following other institutions’ lagged REIT property-type demand (0.4022) from Eq. (3). Both 
partitioned correlation coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level, based on t-statistics 
calculated using Newey-West standard errors from the time-series of regression coefficient 
estimates. The partitioned regression coefficient that arises from institutional investors following 
their own lagged demand constitutes about 25% of the total correlation, and the partitioned 
correlation coefficient attributed to institutional investors following lagged demand of other 
institutional investors constitutes other 75% of the total correlation, providing support for REIT 
property-type herding behavior. 
We further explore what types of REITs tend to drive the second portion of the 
correlation in Eq. (3). We examine the partitioned coefficient in the third column of Panel A by 
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property type, and report the results in Panel B of Table 2. Institutions do not exhibit herding in 
Diversified REITs. This is not surprising, since Diversified REITs consist of holdings across 
multiple property types, and any information about a specific property type is likely to be less 
pronounced. The strongest herding effects occur in the property types of Office and Industrial, 
Healthcare, and Lodging and Resorts. We observe a weaker effect for Retail REITs. Since 
Gyourko and Nelling (1996) find that systematic risk varies by property type and is the highest 
for Retail REITs, it may be the case that institutions find the trades of others less informative in 
this property type. Ro and Gallimore (2014) also find a lower level of herding in Retail REITs 
compared to other property types.  
3.2. REIT individual stock herding vs. REIT property-type herding 
As reported in Panel B of Table 1, on average, the largest firm in a property type accounts for 
about 28% of the total property-type capitalization, ranging from a minimum of 15.93% to a 
maximum of 98.75% (such a maximum is attributed to Lodging/Resorts with a few companies in 
the beginning of the 1990’s, when Lodging/Resorts was in its early stages as a REIT property 
type). Given such descriptive statistics, it is plausible that institutional herding occurs in 
individual stocks, and not at the broader property-type level. To explore this issue in more detail, 
we use an alternative measure to detect institutional REIT property-type herding, defining the 
property-type demand as the weighted average demand for stocks in each REIT property type. 
Specifically, the institutional demand for each REIT security i in quarter t is defined as the ratio 
of the number of institutional investors increasing their positions in stock i to the total number of 
the REIT stock i traders: 
 	߂௜,௧ ൌ 	 # ܾݑݕ݁ݎݏ ݋݂ ݏݐ݋ܿ݇ ݅ ݅݊ ݍݑܽݎݐ݁ݎ ݐ#	ܾݑݕ݁ݎݏ	݋݂	ݏݐ݋ܿ݇ ݅ ݅݊ ݍݑܽݎݐ݁ݎ ݐ ൅ # ݏ݈݈݁݁ݎݏ ݋݂ ݏݐ݋ܿ݇ ݅	݅݊	ݍݑܽݎݐ݁ݎ	ݐ 
 
 
(4) 
The weighted institutional demand is, therefore, defined as the capitalization-weighted demand 
across stocks in property type k: 
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߂∗௞,௧ ൌ ෍߱௜,௧߂௜,௧
ூೖ,೟
௜ୀଵ
 
 
 
(5) 
where ߱݅,ݐ is stock i’s market capitalization weight in REIT property type k at the end of quarter 
t. 
The weighted cross-sectional correlation between weighted institutional demand in 
quarter t and quarter t-1 is then partitioned in the following four components (see Choi and Sias 
(2009) for proof): 
 ߩሺ߂∗௞,௧, ߂∗௞,௧ିଵሻ
ൌ 	 1ሺܭ െ 1ሻߪሺ߂∗௞,௧ሻߪሺ߂∗௞,௧ିଵሻ෍ሺ෍ሺ߱௜,௧߱௜,௧ିଵ
ூೖ,೟
௜ୀଵ
ሺ෍ቆܦ௡,௜,௧ െ ߂
∗തതത௞,௧
௜ܰ,௧
ቇ ൈ ሺܦ௡,௜,௧ିଵ െ ߂
∗തതത௞,௧ିଵ
௜ܰ,௧ିଵ
ሻሻሻሻ
ே೔,೟
௡ୀଵ
௄
௞ୀଵ
൅	 1ሺܭ െ 1ሻߪሺ߂∗௞,௧ሻߪሺ߂∗௞,௧ିଵሻ෍ሺ෍ሺ߱௜,௧߱௜,௧ିଵሺ
ூೖ,೟
௡ୀ௜
෍ ෍ ሺ
ே೔,೟షభ
௠ୀଵ,௠ஷ௡
ܦ௡,௜,௧ െ ߂∗തതത௞,௧
௜ܰ,௧
ሻ
ே೔,೟
௡ୀଵ
௄
௞ୀଵ
ൈ ሺܦ௠,௜,௧ିଵ െ ߂
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௜ܰ,௧ିଵ
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(6) 
where Ni,t is the number of institutional investors trading the REIT stock i in quarter t and ܦ௡,௜,௧ is 
a dummy variable that equals one if an institution purchases security i in quarter t and zero if an 
institution sells security i in quarter t. The first addendum of Eq. (6) is the component of the 
correlation coefficient attributed to institutional investors following their own trades in the same 
REIT security. The second addendum of Eq. (6) is the portion of the correlation coefficient that 
originates from institutional investors following other institutional investors into the same REIT 
stock. The third term is the portion of the correlation coefficient that arises from institutional 
investors following their own trades into different securities within the same REIT property type, 
and the last addendum of Eq. (6) is the component of the weighted correlation coefficient 
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attributed to institutional investors following others into different REIT securities within the same 
property type. 
Table 3 reports the partitioned correlation coefficients and their associated Newey-West 
t-statistics. The cross-sectional correlation between weighted institutional demand this quarter 
and last quarter averages 0.7896. Our decomposition of this correlation indicates that the largest 
component (0.6846) is due to investors following the lagged trades of others into different stocks 
in the same property type. In addition, we find that institutions do not follow others into the same 
stock (the partitioned correlation is 0.0216 and insignificant). These results suggest that herding 
behavior among REIT investors is more likely to occur at the property-type level than at the 
individual stock level. 
3.3. Alternative herding measure 
Many existing studies of herding behavior among institutional investors employ a herding 
measure developed by Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (LSV) (1992). This measure, which was 
also used by Ro and Gallimore (2014), is designed to capture the disproportionate number of 
buyers and sellers of a given stock in a given quarter. The basic intuition behind the LSV herding 
measure is illustrated in the following example. Assuming that in a given quarter, aggregated 
across the population of investors and securities, 50% of the changes in shares are positive and 
50% of the changes in shares are negative. If it happens that 50% of investors are buyers and 50% 
of investors are sellers, the LSV herding measure would indicate that there is no herding observed 
in the market. On the other hand, assume that for many securities, 70% of investors increase their 
holdings and the rest, 30% of investors, decrease their holdings. In this situation, more investors 
appear to be on one side of the market than on the other side of the market, and the measure 
would signal of herding behavior observed among investors. 
To gain additional insights about institutional herding in REITs, we use this measure to 
evaluate the average herding across every REIT property type every quarter. The LSV herding 
measure is defined as: 
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 ܪ௞,௧ ൌ |߂௞,௧ െ ௞ܲ,௧| െ ܣܨ௞,௧ 
 
 
(7) 
where ߂௞,௧	is the fraction of the number of managers buying property type k to the total number 
of active traders in property type k in quarter t, ܲ݇,ݐ is defined as the expected proportion of 
institutions buying property type k in quarter t relative to the number of active traders (the cross-
sectional average ߂௞,௧തതതതത), and ܣܨ݇,ݐ is the adjustment factor. The adjustment factor is the expected 
value of |߂௞,௧ െ	 ௞ܲ,௧|	 and accounts for the fact that the absolute value of ሺ߂௞,௧ െ	 ௞ܲ,௧ሻ	 is 
positive under the null hypothesis of no herding. The adjustment factor, ܣܨ݇,ݐ, is calculated based 
on the assumption that the number of investors in property type k in quarter t follows a binomial 
distribution with the probability of success, the probability of buying, equal to ܲ݇,ݐ. 
Our analysis of the LSV herding measure across REIT property types produces a single 
value, so we report the untabulated result here. The measure averages 0.64% for 525 property-
type-quarter observations (75 quarters times 7 property types), and is statistically different from 
zero (the t-statistic is 2.69). The magnitude of the LSV measure we find for REITs is lower than 
that found by Ro and Gallimore, which was 1.67%. This suggests that herding in REITs across a 
wide range of institutional investors occurs to a lesser extent than it does within real estate mutual 
funds. This finding is intuitive, since institutional investors’ portfolios tend to have a broader 
investment focus than real estate mutual funds, which concentrate on REITs and other real estate 
securities. 
The interpretation of our value of the LSV herding measure is that given the average 
institutional property-type demand of 50.17% (as reported in Table 1), in any randomly selected 
property-type-quarter, we would expect 50.81% (50.17%+0.64%) of traders on one side of the 
market (buying or selling), and 49.19% of traders on the other. In summary, both the Choi and 
Sias (2009) and Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) measures reveal evidence of property-
type herding by institutional investors in REITs. 
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3.4. Herding and reputation 
Research on herding behavior suggests that institutions may be motivated to herd for 
reputational purposes. For instance, Sias (2004) proposes that if institutions herd due to 
reputational motives, they should be more likely to follow institutions of the same type, rather 
than institutions of a different type (e.g., banks will tend to follow the trades of other banks, 
instead of insurance companies). Moreover, since different types of institutions may operate 
under different aspects of regulatory pressure, have differences in financial or other constraints, 
or be more sensitive to the influence of their competitive environment, there is a reason to expect 
different degrees of herding across various types of institutional investors. For example, changes 
in a mutual fund’s reputation would most likely be reflected in their net flows. Alternatively, 
changes in the reputational aspect of insurance companies may affect their net flows to a lesser 
extent. Therefore, since the functionality of investment companies, as well as financial advisors, 
is more prone to reputational factors than it is for other institutional investor types, one would 
expect the tendency of herding to be more pronounced among investment companies and 
financial advisors than among others. 
Thomson Financial assigns all institutional investors into five major classifications: 
advisors, banks, insurance companies, investment companies, and other (pension funds, 
endowments, etc). We follow Choi and Sias (2009) to measure each investor type’s propensity to 
herd in two ways: 1) as their average contribution from following institutions of a similar type 
and 2) their average contribution from following institutions of a different type. For example, 
each quarter, the average same-type herding contribution for banks is defined as following: 
 
	ܵܽ݉݁ െ ݐݕ݌݁௧஻௔௡௞௦ ൌ 17෍ሺ෍ ෍
ሺܦ௕,௞,௧ െ ̅߂௞,௧ሻሺܦ௠,௞,௧ିଵ െ ̅߂௞,௧ିଵሻ
ܤ௞,௧ܤ௞,௧ିଵ∗
஻ೖ,೟షభ∗
௠ୀଵ,௠ஷ௕,௠∈஻
ሻ
஻ೖ,೟
௕ୀଵ
଻
௞ୀଵ
 
 
 
 
(8) 
59  
where Bk,t is the number of banks trading property type k in quarter t and B*k,t is the number of 
different banks trading property type k in quarter t-1. Similarly, the average different-type herding 
contribution for banks is the following: 
 
	ܦ݂݂݅݁ݎ݁݊ݐ െ ݐݕ݌݁௧஻௔௡௞௦ ൌ 17෍ሺ෍ ෍
ሺܦ௕,௞,௧ െ ̅߂௞,௧ሻሺܦ௠,௞,௧ିଵ െ ̅߂௞,௧ିଵሻ
ܤ௞,௧ሺ ௞ܰ,௧ିଵ െ ܤ௞,௧ିଵሻ
ேೖ,೟షభି஻ೖ,೟షభ
௠ୀଵ,௠∈஻
ሻ
஻ೖ,೟
௕ୀଵ
଻
௞ୀଵ
 
 
 
 
(9) 
where ௞ܰ,௧ିଵ െ ܤ௞,௧ିଵ is the number of non-banks trading property type k in quarter t-1. Average 
same-type and different-type herding contributions are computed for each of the five institutional 
investor types. Using Equation (3), we compute the average contribution from following their 
own lagged trades for each investor type and the average contribution from following other 
investors’ trades across all other trader types. 
Table 4 reports the results of the herding tests by investor type. The first column reports 
the average contribution from investors following their own trades, and the second column shows 
the average contribution from following other institutional investors’ trades into and out of 
property types. All contribution coefficients in both columns are positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level for each investor type, except for investment companies’ contribution 
from following others. The third column reports the average contribution from following 
similarly classified investors, and the fourth column documents the average contribution from 
following differently classified investors. Investment advisors tend to follow lagged trades of 
other institutional investors, regardless of their classification types. Banks tend to follow other 
banks. In contrast, insurance companies follow the lagged trades of differently classified 
investors. Investment companies, on average, do not appear to engage in herding behavior. The 
last column of Table 4 documents the difference between the third and fourth columns. This is a 
test of whether each investor type is more likely to herd after similarly classified investors or 
differently classified investors. 
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Overall, the herding behavior of financial advisors and banks is consistent with the 
reputational herding hypothesis. As expected, the nature of the competitive environment in which 
financial advisors operate can explain why they exhibit the strongest tendency to follow similar-
type investors. Surprisingly, this is not found to hold for investment companies (e.g. mutual 
funds) - institutions for whom reputation is very important. The reputational hypothesis also holds 
for the case of banks. This finding seems intuitive, since bank trust departments’ flows may also 
be driven by their past performance. In addition, it is reasonable that the reputational hypothesis 
does not hold for insurance companies and unclassified investors, since these types of 
institutional investors are less likely to experience changes in flows due to fluctuations in their 
reputation levels. 
3.5. Herding and property-type momentum 
Institutional investors may herd in and out of REIT property types because property-type 
demand is positively associated with lagged property-type returns. In other words, momentum 
can drive institutional herding. To examine this possibility, we run cross-sectional regressions of 
institutional property-type demand on lagged property-type returns, measured over the previous 
quarter, six months, or one year. Property-type returns are value-weighted. In addition, we also 
estimate regressions of contemporaneous institutional demand on the lagged institutional 
property-type demand over the previous quarter, six months, and one year. To facilitate the 
interpretation of the coefficient estimates, we standardize both institutional demand and property-
type returns by subtracting their cross-sectional mean and dividing them by their cross-sectional 
standard deviation. In each quarter, we estimate the following regression model and report the 
average coefficients for the 74 cross-sectional regressions (the standardized variables are marked 
by the tildes): 
 
߂ሚ௞,௧ ൌ ߚଵ,௧߂ሚ௞,௧ିଵ + ߚଶ,௧ ෨ܴ௞,௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ௞,௧ 
 
 
(10)
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Table 5 presents the results of the cross-sectional regressions of institutional demand on 
lagged institutional demand and lagged property-type returns. Consistent with the results reported 
in Table 2, the coefficient of institutional property-type demand on lagged property-type demand 
is 0.5359. To obtain the lagged six-month property-type demand and the lagged yearly property-
type demand, we define a manager as a buyer or a seller based on changes in holdings (Eq. (1)) 
over the previous six months or one year, respectively. The fourth and seventh columns of Table 
5 indicate that institutional property-type demand is strongly and positively associated with 
demand measured over the previous six months or a year. The second, fifth, and eighth columns 
of Table 5 report that institutional demand is positively correlated with property-type returns 
measured over the previous quarter or six months and negatively correlated with property-type 
returns measured over the previous year. These findings suggest that REIT investors appear to 
engage in momentum trading at the property-type level. 
The third and sixth columns of Table 5 reveal that REIT property-type demand is 
positively associated with both the lagged demand and lagged property-type return measured over 
the previous quarter and the previous six months, respectively. However, the last column of Table 
5 indicates that demand is positively correlated with the lagged demand and inversely correlated 
with the lagged return, measured over the previous year. This suggests the evidence that positive-
feedback trading affects REIT investors’ property-type demand over short-term horizons.  
As illustrated by Table 5, in the regression of institutional demand on the lagged demand 
and property-type returns measured over the previous quarter, the coefficient associated with lag 
standardized returns averages 0.1709 and is statistically significant at the 1% level. Because the 
variables are standardized, this result is interpreted as a one standard deviation increase in last 
quarter's return leads to 0.1709 standard deviation greater in contemporaneous property-type 
demand. However, institutional momentum trading constitutes a smaller portion of institutional 
herding. More specifically, adding a lag return to the regression has a very little influence on the 
average coefficient on the previous quarter’s property-type demand. As supported by Table 5, the 
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average coefficient associated with the lagged demand measured over the previous quarter 
decreases from 0.5359 to 0.5022, when lagged return is added to the model. Since all variables 
are standardized, the coefficients are directly comparable - the average coefficient on the lagged 
demand is about 200% larger than the average coefficient associated with lagged property-type 
return. The suggests that a one standard deviation change in lagged demand predicts a 200% 
greater change in the following quarter’s demand than a one standard deviation change in lagged 
return. In addition, adding lagged returns increases the explanatory power of the model by only a 
small amount, as evidenced by the marginal increase in adjusted R2. 
Overall, the findings reveal substantial evidence that REIT investors engage in positive-
feedback trading over short-term horizons. However, the relation between contemporaneous 
property-type demand and lagged demand does not change much after accounting for past 
property-type returns. Hence, momentum trading does not appear to be the primary driver of 
institutional herding among REIT investors. 
To further investigate institutional investors’ tendency to engage in momentum trading, 
we analyze if various property-type momentum strategies appear to be profitable. Similar to the 
industry momentum strategy of Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999), we experiment with possible 
REIT property-type momentum strategies for various formation and holding periods. To start, we 
calculate monthly value-weighted REIT property-type returns from January 1993 through 
December 2011. Each month, all REITs are ranked based on their property types’ past 
performance over the p-month horizon. The number of months in the formation period, p, 
includes 3, 6, 9, and 12 months. Based on the past performance sort, the top two property types 
form the winner portfolio, and the bottom two property types constitute the loser portfolio. The 
property-type returns in the winner and loser portfolios are equally-weighted. The winner and 
loser portfolios are held for the following q months. The number of months in the holding period, 
q, includes 3, 6, 9, and 12 months. For example, in month t of a (9;6) REIT property-type 
momentum strategy, we rank property types based on their (t-9) to (t-1) returns. We then compute 
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the equally-weighted return of the top two property types (winner portfolio) and the equally-
weighted return of the bottom two property types (loser portfolio) from t to (t+5). The return to 
the REIT property-type momentum strategy in this month is the difference between returns for 
the winner and loser portfolios. 
Table 6 reports the returns for the REIT property-type strategies for various formation and 
holding periods. None of the momentum strategies are profitable, as the difference in returns 
between winner and loser portfolios is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Therefore, 
consistent with the evidence reported in Table 5, momentum is not likely to be the primary source 
of source of institutional property-type herding. 
3.6. REIT property-type demand and returns 
  One possible explanation for herding behavior suggests that investors may trade in the 
same direction as a result of reacting to correlated information signals. Wermers (1999) notes that 
herding may contribute to the process of a correct price adjustment. In contrast, studies such as 
Sias, Starks, and Titman (2006) and Gutierrez and Kelley (2009) suggest that herding may drive 
prices further away from fundamentals. 
In this section, we attempt to differentiate between the correlated signals explanation 
from alternative explanations by studying the relationship between institutional demand and 
lagged, contemporaneous, and subsequent returns. If herding behavior among investors reflects 
correlated signals being incorporated into prices, then institutional demand should be positively 
associated with current property-type returns and not negatively associated with subsequent 
returns, as institutions engage in the price correction process. On the other hand, if herding tends 
to move prices away from their intrinsic values, then institutional demand should be positively 
correlated with contemporaneous property-type returns and negatively associated with subsequent 
returns. 
We start examining this hypothesis by identifying property types with highest excess 
demand and lowest excess demand relative to the quarterly cross-sectional average demand. Each 
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quarter, excess demand is computed as the difference between the demand in a given property 
type and average cross-sectional demand aggregated across all seven property types. We next 
calculate value-weighted returns of the identified property types with the highest and lowest 
excess demands starting two quarters prior to the formation period and up to three quarters 
following formation. In addition, having the time-series of quarterly returns, we estimate 
abnormal returns following Fama and French (1993):17 
 
ܴ௣,௧ െ 	 ௙ܴ,௧ ൌ 	ߙ௣ ൅ ߚ௣൫ܴ௠,௧ െ ௙ܴ,௧൯ ൅ ߚௌெ஻ܴௌெ஻,௧ ൅ ߚுெ௅ܴுெ௅,௧ ൅ ߝ௣,௧ 
 
 
(11)
where ܴ݌,ݐ is the quarterly return of property type with highest (lowest) excess demand, ܴ݂,ݐ		is 
the risk-free rate, and ܴ௠,ݐ, ܴܵܯܤ,ݐ,	and ܴܪܯܮ,ݐ are the Fama-French market, size, and value 
factors, respectively.18 
Panel A of Table 7 reports average value-weighted returns (the first two columns), as 
well as Fama-French three-factor model alphas (the fourth and fifth columns), for property types 
with highest and lowest excess demands from two quarters prior to the formation quarter and up 
to three quarters following formation. The third column reveals the difference between returns of 
property types with highest and lowest excess demands and their associated t-statistics. The last 
column of Panel A reports the difference in alphas (based on Eq. (11)), obtained from time-series 
regressions of returns of property types with highest and lowest excess demands. 
The results, reported in Panel A of Table 7, provide the support for the hypothesis that 
institutional demand impacts prices. In the formation quarter and up to two quarters prior to 
formation, property types with highest excess demands outperform those with lowest excess 
demands by 2.60%, 4.01%, and 4.38% per quarter, respectively. The differences in alphas 
                                                            
17 Derwall, Huij, Brounen, and Marquering (2009) suggest that the conventional multi-factor models do not 
fully explain the cross-section of REIT returns, and find that a REIT momentum factor provides additional 
explanatory power. Our study is at the property-type level, and our results in Table 6 show that a 
momentum-based strategy does not yield abnormal returns. As a result, we are comfortable with 
interpreting the alphas from three-factor models. 
18 Quarterly market, size, and value factors were obtained from Ken French's web site. 
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between portfolios with highest excess demand and lowest excess demand are 3.41%, 3.91%, and 
4.83% (all are statistically significant at the 1% level) during the formation period, one quarter 
prior to formation, and two quarters prior to formation, respectively. This outcome can be 
explained, at least partially, by institutional momentum trading (the results in Table 5 also support 
this conjecture). However, while the results indicate a strong positive relation between property-
type demand and returns during and prior to the formation quarter, there is no evidence of 
subsequent return reversals. Overall, these findings reveal that correlated information signals 
drive institutional property-type herding. 
We further explore the correlated signals explanation for institutional herding behavior by 
analyzing returns in the private commercial real estate market. A number of studies examine the 
interactions between private and public real estate markets. One widely-observed phenomenon is 
that returns in the public REIT market predict returns in the private real estate market. For 
example, Yunus, Hansz, and Kennedy (2012) find that price discovery occurs first in the public 
real estate market, and later in the private market. Exploring the cointegrated behavior of the 
NCREIF19 index, which represents returns of privately held commercial real estate, and the 
NAREIT index, Li, Mooradian, and Yang (2009) document that REIT returns Granger-cause 
NCREIF returns. However, Ling and Naranjo (2015) do not find support for this lead-lag relation, 
after standard asset pricing control variables are included in the analysis. Based on this evidence, 
Ling and Naranjo conclude that fundamental asset pricing information is incorporated in REIT 
returns more quickly than in private market returns. 
As noted above, the analysis in Panel A of Table 7 suggests that correlated information 
signals are likely to explain our finding of institutional herding. If this is true, then given the 
evidence on the lead-lag relation between the private and public real estate markets, we expect 
that the information content of herding in property types is likely to be reflected more quickly in 
REIT prices than in the private commercial real estate market. 
                                                            
19 National Council of Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries 
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We use the NCREIF Transaction Based Index (TBI) to measure the performance in the 
private real estate market. This index is available at the property-type level, and reports quarterly 
performance of commercial real estate properties acquired in the private market for investment 
purposes only.20  The available property types include Apartment, Retail, Industrial, and Office. 
For comparability of the NCREIF property types and REIT property sectors in our sample, we 
treat the NCREIF Apartment category as REIT Residential. In addition, our property-type 
definitions combine Office and Industrial, whereas the NCREIF index reports them separately. To 
mitigate this issue, we take an equally-weighted average return of the NCREIF Office and 
Industrial property sectors. Overall, given the data availability, our analysis of the NCREIF TBI 
index is restricted to the following three property types: Retail, Residential, and Office/Industrial. 
To explore how price effects of institutional herding behavior are transmitted from the 
public real estate market to the private market, we perform a similar analysis described in Panel A 
of Table 7. However, we now use the NCREIF TBI property index quarterly returns. Among the 
three property types (Retail, Residential, and Office/Industrial), we identify those with the highest 
and lowest excess demand in each quarter (the formation quarter). We then estimate the 
performance of these property types before, during, and after the formation quarter. The results 
are reported in Panel B of Table 7. 
Consistent with our earlier findings in Panel A, the difference in the NCREIF TBI index 
returns for property types with the highest and lowest excess demand is statistically significant in 
one and two quarters prior to the formation quarter. The raw NCREIF TBI property index return, 
as well as the abnormal return (three-factor alpha), for the property sector with the highest excess 
demand is also significantly greater than that with the lowest excess demand during the formation 
and in each of the two quarters after the formation quarter. The lack of a return reversal is 
consistent with the correlated signals explanation for institutional herding. Moreover, the 
persistence in returns after the formation quarter is consistent with the documented lead-lag 
                                                            
20 These data are obtained at https://www.ncreif.org/tbi-returns.aspx. 
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relation between the private and the public real estate markets. In summary, the change in 
institutional demand conveys information to investors, but this information dissipates quicker in 
public real estate markets than in private markets.  
 
4. Conclusion 
This study documents that institutional investors exhibit herding behavior in REIT 
property types. We demonstrate that property-type demand in this quarter is strongly and 
positively correlated with property-type demand in the previous quarter, and approximately 75% 
of this correlation is attributed to institutional investors following lagged trades of other 
institutional investors. To a small extent, institutional investors tend to follow their own lagged 
trades into the same stocks. However, the main cause of herding in REITs is the tendency of 
institutions to follow the lagged trades of others into and out of different stocks in the same 
property type. This suggests that herding behavior in REITs appears to be at the property-type 
level, rather than at the individual-stock level. In addition, the results reveal that REIT investors 
are positive-feedback traders, but momentum trading does not seem to be the primary source of 
herding among REIT institutional investors. We find no evidence of return reversals after 
herding, which suggests that correlated information signals drive institutional property-type 
herding. Any information reflected in the change in institutional demand dissipates quicker in 
public than in private commercial real estate markets.  
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Table 1: Summary statistics on institutional trading in REITs 
Panel A reports the quarterly cross-sectional summary statistics of institutional trading and 
demand on a quarterly basis over the period 1993-2011. Panel B displays the time-series 
average of the property-type market capitalization and the portion attributed to the largest firm.  
The first column of Panel C reports the total number of REITs in the sample by property 
type. All other columns of this panel report time-series descriptive statistics for all seven REIT 
property types: the average number of companies in the property type, the property type’s market 
capitalization weight, and the mean and standard deviation of institutional demand for each 
property type. The institutional demand for each REIT property-type quarter is defined as the 
ratio of the number of institutional buyers to the total number of institutional buyers and sellers in 
the property type over one quarter. 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Institutional investor statistics 
 
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std.dev. 
 
# of institutions trading in a REIT type 
 
1697
 
1478
 
844
 
2899 
 
739
# of advisors trading 757 666 374 1315 335 
# of banks trading 269 244 140 443 112 
# of insurance companies trading 125 107 56 221 60 
# of investment companies trading 151 126 74 272 72 
# of unclassified investors trading 395 343 199 653 165 
# buyers/(# buyers+# sellers) 50.17% 49.62% 48.54% 52.39% 1.43% 
 
Panel B: Property-type statistics 
 
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std.dev. 
 
Property type capitalization 
 
14.29%
 
14.55%
 
7.11%
 
21.75% 
 
3.54%
Largest firm in property type 27.73% 23.48% 15.96% 98.75% 12.27%
 
Panel C: Statistics by property type 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     Property-type demand 
 # of firms 
in the sample 
Average 
# of firms 
%Market 
capitalization 
Mean Std. dev. 
 
Diversified 
 
54 
  
10.73%
 
0.4958 
 
0.1246
Healthcare 19 11 8.67% 0.5063 0.1324 
Lodging/Resorts 27 13 7.78% 0.5239 0.1658 
Office/Industrial 59 26 22.40% 0.5160 0.1380 
Other 38 12 10.76% 0.4854 0.1211 
Residential 48 22 16.44% 0.4962 0.1265 
Retail 64 30 23.22% 0.4886 0.1260 
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Table 2: Correlations in REIT property-type institutional demand 
 
Panel A of this table reports the results of partitioning the correlation coefficient in institutional demand 
from Eq. (3). The first column reports the time-series average correlation coefficient between institutional 
property-type demand in quarter t and quarter t−1. The second column displays the portion of the 
correlation coefficient attributed to institutional investors following their own lagged demand, and the third 
column reports the portion attributed to institutional investors following the lagged demand of others. Panel 
B reports the results of further partitioning of the coefficient in the third column of Panel A by property 
type. T-statistics are calculated using Newey-West (1987) standard errors from the time-series of regression 
coefficient estimates. Symbols ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Partitioned autocorrelation coefficient 
  Average Institutions following Institutions following
  autocorrelation their own lagged other institutions’ lagged
  coefficient property-type demand property-type demand 
Property-type 
demand 
0.5359
(10.81)*** 
0.1337
(2.81)*** 
0.4022 
(5.22)*** 
 
Panel B: Institutions following other institutions’ lagged demand - by property type 
  Average portion t-statistic
Diversified 0.0009 (0.07)
Healthcare 0.0928** (2.51)
Lodging/Resorts 0.0815*** (2.68)
Office/Industrial 0.0973*** (2.72)
Other 0.0588*** (3.69)
Residential 0.0411** (2.45)
Retail 0.0296 (1.30)
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Table 3: Institutional herding at the property-type vs. individual-REIT level 
 
The table reports the time-series average correlation coefficient between weighted institutional property-
type demand in quarter t and quarter t − 1 by property type. The top left-hand cell reports the portion of 
correlation attributed to institutional investors following themselves into the same stock. The left-hand cell 
in the middle row contains a portion of correlation attributed to institutional investors following others into 
the same stock. The middle cell in the top row displays a portion of correlation that arises from institutional 
investors following themselves into different REITs in the same property type, and the middle cell in the 
middle row illustrates a portion of correlation attributed to institutional investors following other 
institutions into different REITs in the same property type. T-statistics are calculated using Newey-West  
(1987)  standard  errors from the time-series of regression coefficient estimates. Symbols ***, ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  
Partitioned correlation coefficient 
 
    Into different stocks 
in the same 
 
Into the same stock property type Total 
Following themselves 0.0154 
(2.84)*** 
0.0680 
(1.82)* 
0.0834 
(1.96)** 
Following others 0.0216 0.6846 0.7062 
  (1.27) (11.39)*** (10.18)*** 
 
Total 
 
0.0370 
(2.37)** 
 
0.7526 
(23.22)*** 
 
0.7896 
(21.88)*** 
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Table 4: Herding analysis by investor type 
 
This table reports the partitioned correlation in institutional demand by investor type. The first column 
presents each investor type’s propensity to follow their own lagged property- type demand and the second 
column presents investors’ propensity to follow other institutional investors into the same property type. 
The third column reports the average contribution to the correlation from different investor types following 
similarly classified institutions, e.g., insurance companies following other insurance companies. The 
average contribution that arises from investors following other investors of a different type is re- ported in 
the fourth column. The last column reports the difference between the average contribution from following 
same-type traders and the average contribution from follow- ing different-type traders. All t-statistics are 
calculated based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors. Symbols ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 (1) 
Average 
contribution 
from 
(2) 
Average 
contribution 
from 
(3) 
Average 
contribution 
from following 
(4) 
Average 
contribution 
from following 
(3)-(4) 
Average “same 
contribution” 
following following same- different- less 
their own others’ type type “different 
trades trades traders traders contribution” 
Advisors 0.00024 
(6.01)*** 
0.00011 
(3.51)*** 
0.00118 
(3.27)*** 
0.00003 
(2.24)** 
0.00115 
(3.27)*** 
Banks 0.00091 0.00005 0.00251 0.00002 0.00249 
 (2.44)** (1.78)* (3.70)*** (1.53) (3.72)*** 
Insurance 0.00090 0.00002 0.00096 0.00001 0.00095 
companies (2.94)*** (3.09)*** (1.07) (2.34)** (1.06) 
Investment 0.00247 0.00000 -0.00018 0.00000 -0.00018 
companies (2.83)*** (0.05) (-0.34) (0.38) (-0.34) 
Other 0.00189 0.00004 0.00129 0.00001 0.00128 
 (3.25)*** (3.35)*** (1.64) (1.89)* (1.63) 
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Table 5:   REIT property-type herding and momentum 
 
Each column in this table reports the time-series average coefficient from 74 cross-sectional regressions (from September 1993 to December 2011) of 
standardized institutional property-type demand in a given quarter on standardized lagged institutional property-type demand over the previous quarter, 
six months, or year and/or standardized property-type returns the previous quarter, six months, or year. All t-statistics are adjusted based on Newey and 
West (1987) standard errors, computed from the time-series of coefficient estimates, and are reported in parentheses. Symbols ***, ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  Measured over previous
quarter 
Measured over previous
six months 
Measured over previous
year 
Lagged institutional 0.5359 0.5022 0.5015 0.4694 0.3927 0.3923
demand (10.81)***   (8.49)*** (12.76)***   (11.09)*** (8.75)***   (6.56)***
Lagged return   0.1873 0.1709   0.2721 0.2392   -0.1665 -0.1829 
    (3.41)*** (3.85)***   (4.25)*** (5.93)***   (-2.21)** (-2.92)***
Adjusted R2 26.69% 5.21% 26.80% 23.02% 7.37% 26.02% 33.59% 20.95% 16.69% 
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Table 6: Returns from REIT property-type momentum strategies 
 
This table reports the average monthly portfolio returns from January 1993 through December 2011 for 
REIT property momentum strategies. Portfolios are formed based on past p-month REIT property-type 
returns and held for the following q-months. The property- type return is calculated as the value-weighted 
average return of REITs in that type. The winner (loser) portfolio is constructed as an equally-weighted 
portfolio of the top (bottom) two property types sorted based on the past p-month REIT property-type 
return. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Symbols ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Strategy (p; q) Winners Losers Difference 
(6;6) 1.29 1.01 0.28 
 (3.81)*** (2.34)** (1.31) 
(3;3) 1.27 1.05 0.22 
 (3.73)*** (2.43)** (1.09) 
(3;6) 1.22 1.06 0.16 
 (3.60)*** (2.53)** (0.86) 
(3;9) 1.20 1.04 0.16 
 (3.57)*** (2.49)** (0.95) 
(3;12) 1.20 1.06 0.14 
 (3.54)*** (2.54)** (0.95) 
(6;3) 1.34 1.03 0.31 
 (3.85)*** (2.32)** (1.28) 
(6;9) 1.28 1.03 0.25 
 (3.81)*** (2.39)** (1.22) 
(6;12) 1.25 1.05 0.20 
 (3.76)*** (2.48)** (1.08) 
(9;3) 1.32 0.99 0.33 
 (3.82)*** (2.26)** (1.32) 
(9;6) 1.31 0.98 0.33 
 (3.89)*** (2.28)** (1.52) 
(9;9) 1.26 0.99 0.27 
 (3.76)*** (2.33)** (1.30) 
(9;12) 1.24 1.02 0.22 
 (3.71)*** (2.43)** (1.11) 
(12;3) 1.30 0.99 0.31 
 (3.88)*** (2.18)** (1.24) 
(12;6) 1.30 0.99 0.31 
 (3.88)*** (2.28)** (1.33) 
(12;9) 1.26 0.98 0.28 
 (3.78)*** (2.28)** (1.23) 
(12;12) 1.24 1.03 0.21 
 (3.72)*** (2.41)** (1.00) 
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Table 7: Price effects of property-type herding 
 
Panel A of this table reports quarterly value-weighted REIT returns and abnormal returns for property types 
with highest and lowest excess demands over the formation quarter (Quarter 0), up to two quarters prior to 
formation, and up to three quarters after formation. Excess demand is defined as the difference between the 
demand in a given property type and average cross-sectional demand aggregated across all seven property 
types each quarter. Panel B reports the NCREIF TBI property index returns and three-factor alphas, 
estimated using these index returns. The highest and lowest excess demand for the NCREIF property types 
are identified based on the three available property sectors: Residential, Retail, and Office/Industrial. T-
statistics (reported in parentheses) are based on Newey-West standard errors (1987). Symbols ***, ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A : REIT property-type returns 
Property-type value-weighted returns    Fama-French three-factor model alphas 
 
 Highest 
excess 
demand 
Lowest 
excess 
demand 
 
 
Difference 
Highest 
excess demand 
Lowest 
excess 
demand 
 
 
Difference 
Quarter -2 0.0690 0.0252 0.0438 0.0649 0.0166 0.0483 
   (3.74)***   (3.85)*** 
Quarter -1 0.0548 0.0147 0.0401 0.0496 0.0105 0.0391 
   (3.45)***   (3.09)*** 
Quarter 0 0.0585 0.0325 0.0260 0.0294 -0.0047 0.0341 
   (2.66)***   (2.72)*** 
Quarter +1 0.0462 0.0345 0.0117 0.0282 0.0208 0.0074 
   (1.34)   (0.56) 
Quarter +2 0.0375 0.0516 -0.0141 0.0283 0.0520 -0.0237 
   (-1.12)   (-1.72)* 
Quarter +3 0.0461 0.0589 -0.0128 0.0413 0.0590 -0.0177 
   (-0.99)   (-1.27) 
 
Panel B : NCREIF TBI property-type returns 
Property-type NCREIF returns       Fama-French three-factor model alphas 
 
 Highest 
excess 
demand 
Lowest 
excess 
demand 
 
 
Difference 
Highest 
excess demand 
Lowest 
excess 
demand 
 
 
Difference 
Quarter -2 0.0239 0.0194 0.0045 0.0171 0.0128 0.0043 
   (2.99)***   (2.50)** 
Quarter -1 0.0240 0.0202 0.0038 0.0169 0.0132 0.0037 
   (1.91)*   (1.94)* 
Quarter 0 0.0265 0.0195 0.0070 0.0181 0.0111 0.0070 
   (3.91)***   (3.77)*** 
Quarter +1 0.0259 0.0198 0.0061 0.0172 0.0116 0.0056 
   (2.79)***   (3.04)*** 
Quarter +2 0.0257 0.0201 0.0056 0.0154 0.0113 0.0041 
   (2.03)**   (2.17)** 
Quarter +3 0.0248 0.0215 0.0033 0.0143 0.0114 0.0029 
   (1.26)   (1.55) 
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CHAPTER 3: INVESTING IN INNOVATION: EVIDENCE FROM INSTITUTIONAL 
TRADING AROUND PATENT ANNOUNCEMENTS* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 
This study examines institutional trading activity around patent publication dates.  Unlike 
previous studies that use the count of future citations to proxy for patent value, we measure the 
value of innovation using cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around patent announcements.  
We find an increase in institutional demand for a firm’s shares around patent announcements, and 
this increase is correlated with announcement returns.  In addition, the increase in demand is 
greater when the firm’s shareholder base consists of a higher percentage of long-term institutions.  
We find no correlation between patent announcement returns and the future number of citations.  
Patent announcements are also associated with increases in liquidity and analyst coverage, 
indicating that innovation may reduce information uncertainty between a firm and its investors. In 
addition, firms that announce patents exhibit long-term outperformance relative to a control 
sample.  Overall, our results suggest that both investors and firms benefit from innovation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* This essay is coauthored with Edward Nelling, Professor of Finance at Drexel University. We thank Ani 
Mathers as well as session participants at the Eastern Finance Association 2016 meeting for their helpful 
comments and suggestions. 
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1. Introduction 
The ability to innovate and develop new products and services may be one of the most 
important activities a firm undertakes.  Successful innovators have a competitive advantage in the 
marketplace, and the development of the internet has facilitated faster dissemination of 
information on new products.  Innovation also attracts investors.  Recent initiatives, such as 
Kickstarter, allow individuals to invest in innovative companies at an early stage.  On a larger 
scale, institutional investors may increase their demand for shares in public companies that 
demonstrate the ability to innovate.  The link between innovation and institutional investor 
demand is the focus of this paper. 
Our study is an empirical examination of changes in institutional demand for shares in 
firms that announce patents.  We address three important questions.  First, we examine the extent 
to which institutions increase their demand for innovative firms around patent announcements.  
Second, we explore whether the change in demand is related to the value of the patent, as 
measured by the abnormal stock return around the patent announcement, and whether the 
announcement return is related to the number of subsequent patent citations. Third, we examine 
other characteristics associated with changes in institutional demand for innovative firms, such as 
possible changes in stock liquidity and analyst coverage around patent announcements. 
We estimate the market reaction to the patent announcement using three-day cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) around the patent publication date.  We believe that this approach of 
estimating patent value offers an advantage over measures used in existing studies.  Generally, 
other researchers have used input and output measures to proxy for innovation.  Input measures of 
innovation include measures of R&D expenditures.  For example, Chan, Lakonishok, and 
Sougiannis (2001) use R&D as a fraction of sales or market equity.  Other studies focus on the 
patent citation count (e.g. Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013), Fang, Tian, and Tice 
(2014)).  Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li (2013) estimate innovation efficiency as the number of patents 
and citations, scaled by R&D expenditures.  Although citations may be informative about the 
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quality of a patent (e.g. Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005)), they often take time to accumulate.  
Since we are interested in the response of institutional investors to patent announcements, we 
seek a timelier measure of patent value, and use CARs for this purpose. 
We find that institutions positively respond to patent announcements.  The change in 
institutional demand is strongly and positively associated with the abnormal return around the 
patent publication date.21  This suggests that institutions recognize the value of patent 
announcements by increasing their stake in the issuing firm.  Moreover, we find that the increase 
in demand is greater when there are more long-term investors in the firm’s institutional 
shareholder base.  Our analysis of long-term performance shows that companies that innovate 
significantly outperform their matched control sample firms over the three-year period following 
the patent announcement.  These results suggest that investors can generate superior long-run 
returns by investing in innovative firms.  We also examine other factors influencing institutional 
demand for the announcing firms.  We find that the level of stock liquidity and analyst coverage 
significantly increase after patent announcements, indicating that patent announcements may 
reduce information uncertainty between a company and its investors.  Overall, as institutions 
invest in innovating firms, both the investors and the firms benefit. 
Our results reveal no association between patent announcement returns (CARs) and the 
number of forward citations.  If citations represent a measure of patent value, they appear to be 
unrelated to the market’s short-term assessment.  As Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005) note, a 
patent may keep receiving citations over the long run – more than a decade after its grant date.  
Moreover, the distribution of citations is typically skewed, with a large number of patents having 
no citations whatsoever.22  It is unlikely that the market is able to predict correctly the number of 
future citations and price this expected value immediately after patent announcements.  Thus, it is 
                                                            
21 We measure change in institutional demand by subtracting the demand in the quarter prior to the patent 
announcement quarter from the demand in the quarter after the announcement quarter. 
22 Thirty six percent of patents in our sample have no citations. Fifty four percent of our patents receive from 1 to 10 
citations. The remaining portion (10%) of patents receive 11 or more citations in the future. For reference, about one-
quarter of one million patents in the sample of Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005) have no citations; 150,000 receive 
one, 125,000 patents have two, and 4 patents have more than 200 citations. 
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not surprising that the cumulative returns around patent announcements are not related to the 
number of future citations, because they measure different aspects of patent value.  We believe 
that the use of announcement returns can offer interesting insights related to how market 
participants respond to corporate innovation. 
Our study is not the first to examine the association between institutional ownership and 
innovation.  Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013) document that higher institutional 
ownership leads to more innovation, as measured by a count of future citation-weighted patents. 
In contrast, we examine institutional trading as the reaction to patent announcements. In other 
words, while Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013) document that the level of institutional 
ownership is related to higher levels of future innovation, we examine the changes in institutional 
demand around patent publications. Our setting allows us to explore important aspects of how 
innovation is beneficial to both investors and firms. 
Our study also adds to the literature exploring the importance of liquidity (e.g., Amihud, 
2002), and to the literature studying the relation between institutional ownership and analyst 
coverage (e.g., O’Brien and Bhushan, 1990).  We explore the extent to which these characteristics 
are associated with innovation.  Fang, Tian, and Tice (2014) find that liquidity impedes 
innovation, because it encourages investment by short-term shareholders.  We document that the 
liquidity of a firm’s stock increases around patent announcements.  One important difference 
between our study and Fang, Tian, and Tice (2014) is that they examine the level of liquidity and 
its effect on innovation, whereas we analyze changes in liquidity around patent announcements.23  
We also find that analyst coverage increases significantly after a firm publishes a patent. With a 
correction for the endogenous relation between analysts’ decisions to follow companies and 
institutions’ decisions to hold these companies, our results suggest that coverage increases 
because innovation attracts analysts, and not because more analysts follow these companies due 
                                                            
23 In addition, Fang, Tian, and Tice (2014) use a different measure of liquidity, and they use an aggregate 
measure of innovation (the number of patent citations) for each firm in each year.  Our focus is on the 
patent announcement in an event study framework. 
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to increased institutional demand.  Lang and Lundholm (1996) document that much of 
information that analysts use in their evaluations is provided directly by the firm.  Patent 
publications may therefore contribute to increased information disclosure and are likely to 
positively affect analyst coverage. 
A number of studies explore factors that influence institutional demand for shares.  For 
example, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995), Nofsinger and Sias (1999), and Bennett, Sias, 
and Starks (2003) document that institutional investors are momentum traders.  Gompers and 
Metrick (2001) analyze institutional preferences for stock characteristics and find that institutions 
prefer large and liquid stocks.  In contrast, studying changes in institutional preferences over 
time, Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003) show that institutional preferences for large stocks has 
shifted in favor of smaller and riskier stocks.  Parrino, Sias, and Starks (2003) document that 
significant declines in institutional ownership around forced CEO turnover reflect investor 
dissatisfaction with a firm’s management.  Our results suggest that innovation is another 
important firm characteristic that influences institutional ownership. 
In addition, institutions may exhibit shifts in demand if they are informed about, or are 
able to identify, opportunities for future profitability.  Bodnaruk, Massa, and Simonov (2009) 
document that financial conglomerates, in which affiliated investment banks serve as advisors for 
bidders in acquisitions, increase their positions in targets prior to merger and acquisition 
announcements, expecting a significant rise in the target’s share price.   Baker, Litov, Wachter, 
and Wurgler (2010) document that mutual funds exhibit the ability to forecast earnings surprises, 
and buy stocks that outperform around the next earnings announcement.  We find that innovation 
is related to future performance, as firms announcing patents outperform those in a control 
sample over a one- to three-year horizon. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. We describe the sample construction and 
summary statistics in Section 2.  Section 3 includes the empirical results on trading by 
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institutional investors and changes in liquidity and analyst coverage around patent 
announcements.  Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Data and sample construction 
Our main source of data is the patent dataset constructed by Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru, 
and Stoffman (2014).24  The authors download the entire history of U.S. patents from Google 
Patents.  To match patent information with returns in CRSP and obtain all forward citations, they 
use a number of text algorithms (see their online Data Appendix for more details on data 
construction).  The patent data include the following fields: patent number, application (or file) 
date, publication date, grant (or issuance) date, and the CRSP PERM number. The citations data 
provide the citing patent number and the cited patent number.  Using these two fields, one can 
calculate the number of future citations for a given patent. 
Other sources of data include CRSP (stock returns),  COMPUSTAT (accounting 
variables, such as revenues and R&D expenditures, earnings announcement dates for identifying 
confounding events), and Thomson Financial (institutional holdings). To eliminate other 
confounding events, we use SDC (mergers and acquisitions announcements).  The analyst 
coverage measure is constructed from the IBES detail file.  In addition, we use institutional 
investor classifications proposed by Brian Bushee to differentiate between dedicated, transient, 
and quasi-indexed institutions in our sample.25 
In the process of obtaining a patent, there are three noteworthy dates.  First, the 
application date is the date of filing a request for granting a patent for the invention.  At this 
point, the application is confidential, and known only to the inventor and the patent office. 
                                                            
24 We thank Noah Stoffman for sharing these data on his web-site https://iu.app.box.com/patents. 
25 We are grateful to Brain Bushee for sharing this information on his website 
http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html 
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Second, the publication date is the date at which the content of a patent application becomes 
publicly available.  In our sample, patent applications are published, on average, slightly more 
than one year after the date of filing.  This publicly available information related to the filed 
patent becomes the subject for citations by subsequent patent applications.  Third, once the patent 
application complies with the requirements, the patent is validated and issued on the grant (or 
issuance) date. 
Our sample consists of 2,669 unique companies associated with 98,883 patent 
announcements over the period 2001-2009.  We measure the market reaction to the patent 
announcement by estimating three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the 
publication date.  Panel A of Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics.  The three-day CAR around 
the publication announcement is insignificantly different from zero (the mean is -0.007%, and the 
standard error is 0.011).  This suggests that, on average, patent announcements do not affect 
shareholder wealth.  Alternatively, information about pending patents may be released prior to the 
patent publication date.  The institutional demand variable, percent change in shares held, is 
measured as of one quarter prior to the publication quarter.  The data show that institutional 
demand (percent change in shares held) increases at a decreasing rate during the four quarters 
prior and four quarters after the publication quarter (untabulated).  On average, institutional 
holdings increase by 2.23% prior to the publication quarter. 
Panel B of Table 1 reports the distribution of firms, using the Fama and French 48 
industry classification.  As expected, the most innovative industries include Electronic 
Equipment, Pharmaceutical Products, Business Services,  Machinery, Computer Hardware.  The 
least innovative industries are Coal and Precious Metals. 
We examine the frequency of future citations associated with patents in our sample.  
Panel A of Table 2 reports the citations summary statistics for all 98,883 patent events.  The 
average patent in our sample is cited about four times in the future.  As described earlier, the 
citations dataset includes two fields, the cited patent number and citing patent number.  We 
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identify firms that cite a given patent by mapping the citations dataset to the patent dataset on the 
basis of the cited patent number.  Since one of the variables in the patent dataset is the CRSP 
PERM number, it includes only public companies.  We find that for an average patent, 1.66 out of 
4.16 citations are made by public companies.  Self-citations account for about 39% of this count 
(0.65/1.66).  The remaining count of future citations (2.50, on average) is attributed to private 
companies, or to public companies that are not in the patent dataset. 
We next explore the timing of citations after a patent is published.  Panel B of Table 2 
reports the distribution of citations by year.  The time is measured between the publication date of 
the cited patent and the application date of the citing patent.  Panel B shows that the frequency of 
future citations decreases with time.  Most of the citations occur within the first five years from 
the publication date of the cited patent.26 
As noted above, we believe that announcement returns and citations capture different 
aspects of patent value.  To compare the two measures, in each quarter, we sort patent publication 
events into five equally-sized quintiles based on the three-day cumulative abnormal return around 
the patent publication announcement.  We then calculate the average number of future citations 
associated with patents in each of the five quintiles.  The results, reported in Panel C of Table 2, 
illustrate that patents with the lowest three-day abnormal return around the publication date are 
cited more frequently.  Although the relation between the three-day CAR and the count of future 
citations is inverse, it does not appear to be monotonic. 
Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru, and Stoffman (2014) estimate the dollar value of innovation, 
and it is possible that patent value can be captured better by the total change in shareholder 
wealth around the announcement.  We address this possibility by sorting all patent publications 
into quintiles in each quarter, based on the product of the three-day cumulative abnormal return 
                                                            
26 Patent citations are affected by truncation, as it is more difficult for recent patents to generate citations.  
We address the truncation concern for citations by cutting off the last two years of data.  The descriptive 
statistics of the future citations count over the period 2001-2007 are similar to those during 2001-2009.  
Truncation does not present a problem for our event study analysis. 
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and firm market capitalization.  We then calculate the average number of future citations based on 
this sorting procedure for each quintile.  The second column of Panel C reveals no significant 
relation between the two measures of patent value.    
 
3. Empirical results 
We begin our analysis of changes in institutional ownership around patent 
announcements by calculating abnormal (or excess) institutional demand.  While Aghion, Van 
Reenen, and Zingales (2013) document that institutional ownership is related to higher levels of 
future innovation, we examine the reaction of institutional investors to recent patent 
announcements.  Since previous studies document a strong positive relation between the increase 
in institutional ownership and contemporaneous stock returns, we follow the approach of Parrino, 
Starks, and Sias (2003) to construct a measure of institutional excess demand.  In each quarter, 
we estimate cross-sectional regressions of the percent change in shares held by all institutional 
investors on the contemporaneous quarterly stock return for all firms in the CRSP database that 
have institutional holdings.  Consistent with other studies, we find a strong positive association 
between changes in institutional shares held and contemporaneous returns.  Specifically, from 
these quarterly cross-sectional regressions, the time-series average coefficient is 0.188 and its 
associated t-statistic is 14.04 (untabulated).27 
For each firm in each quarter, we use the residual from the cross-sectional regression as 
our proxy for quarterly excess demand (i.e., demand adjusted for overall increases in institutional 
ownership and the effects of stock returns).  To obtain the two-quarter excess demand, we sum 
the residuals over two quarters. 
Figure 1 illustrates the timeline for estimating the two-quarter excess demand.  Denoting 
quarter t as the patent publication quarter, we calculate the one-quarter change in excess demand 
as the difference between the excess demand in quarter (t+1) and the excess demand in quarter (t-
                                                            
27 For robustness, we also tried including industry fixed effects, which did not affect our results. 
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1).  We calculate the two-quarter change in excess demand as the difference between the excess 
demand in quarters (t+1 and t+2) and the excess demand in quarters (t-2 and t-1). 
3.1. Institutional response to patent announcements 
The change in institutional excess demand around patent publications is shown in Figure 
2.  This shows the evolution of the two-quarter institutional excess demand four quarters prior 
and four quarters after the publication quarter, Q(0).  Observing a gradual increase in institutional 
excess demand around the patent announcement suggests that, on average, institutional investors 
respond positively to innovation.28  Institutional ownership in these companies increases from 
63.15% (of total shares outstanding) before the patent announcement quarter to 64.47% 
afterward.  This increase translates into a dollar value of approximately $54.6 million, on 
average.29  The increase in institutional excess demand around the patent announcement 
motivates our further analysis of the relation between excess demand and the quality of a patent, 
as well as the long-term performance effects of such trading.30 
We explore the multivariate relation between institutional excess demand and patent 
announcements in a regression framework.  We estimate the one-quarter and two-quarter change 
in aggregate institutional excess demand for every firm-quarter observation reported in 13F-
filings over the period 2001 through 2009.  We then create a dummy variable which is set equal 
to one if there is at least one patent announcement by a company in a given quarter, and zero 
otherwise.  The change in institutional abnormal demand is our dependent variable, and the patent 
announcement dummy is our main independent variable of interest.  Table 3 reports the results.  
Consistent with the univariate illustration in Figure 2, institutional excess demand is positively 
                                                            
28 The negative vertical scale in Figure 2 does not imply institutional selling.  On average, institutions increase their 
ownership in companies that introduce a patent, but they do so at a decreasing rate.  Methodologically, the negative 
scale indicates that, on average, the increase in institutional shares held is smaller than the effect of the positive relation 
between returns and changes in institutional ownership. 
29 This average dollar value is estimated as a product of the difference in total shares held by institutions as of the end 
of the quarter following the patent announcement quarter and total shares held in the quarter prior to the announcement 
quarter times the pre-announcement-quarter-end stock price.  This calculation is based on 21,627 firm x patent-
announcement-quarter observations.  If a company introduces multiple patents in a given quarter, it is entered in the 
dataset only once. 
30 We do not observe a similar increasing trend in institutional excess demand for the sample of control firms, matched 
on industry, size, and past six-month returns. 
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associated with patent announcements.  Companies with published patents experience an increase 
in institutional excess demand of 1.3% around the publication quarter, compared to companies 
without announced patents.  The two-quarter increase in demand is 3.2%. 
3.2.  Institutional demand and CARs around patent announcements 
To assess whether institutional investors’ react more strongly to more valuable patents, 
we explore the relation between patent value (the three-day CAR around the publication date) and 
the change in excess demand.  In each quarter, we sort patent publication events into ten equally-
sized deciles based on the three-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around the patent 
publication announcement.  We then calculate average changes in abnormal institutional demand 
for each decile. 
Panel A of Table 4 reports the average three-day CARs.  The next two columns report 
average one-quarter and two-quarter excess demand around the publication quarter, respectively.  
As shown, the companies with the highest CARs around patent announcements experience a 
significantly greater increase in abnormal demand, relative to those with the lowest CARs.  
Economically, this translates into a difference in abnormal demand of about 1.5% over one 
quarter and 2.4% over two quarters.  This suggests that institutional investors recognize the value 
of a patent at the time of publication by increasing their ownership in the firm, and they do so to a 
greater extent when the announcement return is higher. 
Even though we remove confounding events such as earnings, dividends, and mergers 
and acquisitions announcements, it is possible that our results reflect firm-specific events other 
than patent publications, and these events affect the dynamics of institutional demand.  We 
attempt to mitigate this concern by running a falsification test.  The falsification test is performed 
similarly to the sorting procedure described above, except that the patent publication date is 
moved exactly two years back in time, and the change in excess demand is measured around this 
new date.  The results are reported in Panel B of Table 4.  The absence of significant differences 
between the highest and lowest deciles formed based on the three-day CARs suggests that the 
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relation between patent quality and the change in abnormal institutional demand around 
announcements is not coincidental.31 
We next examine the relation between the value of a patent and the change in 
institutional excess demand in a multivariate setting.  To do so, we regress the change in excess 
demand around the publication quarter on the three-day cumulative abnormal return at the 
announcement and a set of control variables.  The set of control variables includes firm size (the 
natural logarithm of market capitalization), the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales, quarterly 
return of a firm, and the percentage of shares held by long-term institutions.  All control 
variables, except R&D expense / Sales, are measured one quarter prior to the patent publication 
quarter.  The ratio of R&D expense to sales is measured as of the end of the year preceding the 
patent publication year. 
Although the pursuit of innovation is intuitively appealing, investors may differ in 
opinion regarding its value.  A myopic view by corporate managers may reduce investment in 
pursuit of innovation, and this myopia may be related to institutional ownership.  In support of 
this view, Bushee (1998) finds that managers reduce R&D spending when institutional ownership 
is high, and when institutions are engaging in high-turnover or momentum trading.  In another 
study, Bushee (2001) finds that higher ownership by institutions with shorter-term investment 
horizons leads to a greater focus on near-term earnings.  In summary, it is not just the level, but 
also the type of institutional ownership, that may be related to the value of innovation. 
It is therefore possible that the constitution of the company’s shareholder base may affect 
the magnitude of abnormal demand change around patent announcements.  We use the 
institutional investor classification from Bushee and Noe (2000) to examine this conjecture.  We 
classify all institutions based on portfolio turnover and position size.  The first group, “dedicated” 
                                                            
31 For additional robustness, we assign randomly selected publication dates to each event in our sample and calculate 
the three-day CARs around these dates. We make sure that a randomly selected date does not fall into the three 
adjacent quarters before and after the actual patent publication quarter.  We then calculate the change in institutional 
excess demand around a new randomly assigned event quarter.  We find no association between the change in 
abnormal demand and the three-day CARs in this falsification test. 
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institutions, tend to have low portfolio turnover and take large investment positions.  The second 
category, “transient” institutions, are characterized by having frequent portfolio turnover and high 
levels of diversification.  The third group, “quasi-indexers,” tend to take a passive, buy-and-hold 
strategy by exhibiting low levels of turnover for their highly diversified holdings. 
Since investing in innovation is not likely to be profitable immediately or in the near 
term, but rather in the long run, we expect that institutions with a long-term focus are likely to 
drive abnormal demand around patent publications.  Out of the three categories, dedicated and 
quasi-indexed investors are less likely to exhibit short-termism.  Therefore, we expect that a 
greater presence of such long-term investors in the firm’s shareholder base is associated with a 
stronger change in excess demand. 
The results are presented in Table 5.  Across all specifications, the three-day abnormal 
return is strongly and positively related with a stronger change in institutional excess demand.  A 
one-standard deviation increase in the three-day CAR results in an increase in excess demand by 
0.42% to 0.68%.  Since the percent change in institutional shares held (raw demand) averages 
2.23% in our sample, this increase in excess demand appears to be non-trivial. 
The change in excess demand is also greater when the institutional shareholder base 
consists of a higher percentage of long-term investors, as indicated by the coefficient on the % 
long-term institutions variable.  Since the payoffs from investing in innovative firms are likely to 
be realized in the long-run, and ultimately benefit institutions with a long-term focus, this result is 
intuitive. 
3.3. Long-term performance following patent announcements 
Since the change in demand is related to the presence of long-term institutions in the 
shareholder base, we examine whether institutional investors benefit over a longer time horizon 
from increasing their ownership around patent publications.  We estimate long-term returns of 
firms that introduce patents and compare them with returns of firms that are similar, except that 
they do not innovate (i.e., we form a control sample with no patent publications). 
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We construct our control sample as follows.  The set of matched firms is obtained on the 
basis of industry, size, and the one-quarter change in excess demand.  For each firm in a given 
quarter, we select the candidates for a match from the same industry and whose market 
capitalization is between 70% and 130% of the treatment firm size.  From this list of firms, we 
then choose the firm with the one-quarter change in excess demand around the patent publication 
quarter that is the closest to the change in excess demand around this quarter of the treatment 
firm.   In addition, we require that the control firm does not introduce any patents during the 12-
month horizon following the publication date of the treatment firm.  As a result, we obtain a 
control group with 21,126 observations for our sample of 26,384 unique firm*quarter 
observations.  Next, we compare the long-term performance of the treatment and control groups, 
including returns measured over 12, 24, and 36 months after the patent publication quarter. 
Table 6 reports the results of this analysis.  We find that the treatment group of firms 
experiences significantly higher returns over 12, 24, and 36 months subsequent to patent 
announcements, compared to the performance of the control group firms.  Firms that introduce 
patents outperform those that do not by about 4% during the three-year period after patent 
publication. 
3.4. Innovation and changes in stock liquidity 
We next examine changes in stock liquidity around the patent publication quarter.  As 
measures of liquidity, we use the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure and stock turnover.  The 
Amihud illiquidity measure is calculated as: 
ܫܮܮܫܳ௜௬ ൌ ଵ஽೔೤ 	෍ หܴ௜௬ௗห/ܸܱܮܦ௜௬ௗ
஽೔೤
௧ୀଵ
                                          (1) 
where Diy is the number of trading days for stock i in quarter y, Riyd is the return on stock i on day 
d of quarter y and VOLDiyd is the daily dollar trading volume.  We estimate this illiquidity 
measure for each stock i in each quarter y, and multiply it by 106.  Stock turnover is calculated as 
the ratio of daily trading volume to total shares outstanding, averaged across all trading days in a 
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quarter, and then multiplied by 100.  We then find the average liquidity measures in each of the 
five quarters around the patent announcement quarter, using the 26,384 unique firm*patent-
announcement-quarter observations.  If a company publishes more than one patent in a given 
quarter, it is associated with only one firm-quarter observation in our analysis. 
Table 7 reports the results.  The first five columns of Panel A report the average 
illiquidity measure and turnover over the five-quarter period around the patent announcement.  
The other columns report the changes in stock liquidity from quarter to quarter.  The results 
suggest that the level of stock liquidity increases after patent announcements: the illiquidity level 
significantly decreases in the second quarter after patent announcements, and turnover 
significantly increases in the two quarters following the publication quarter. 
To emphasize the importance of institutional excess demand around patent publications 
and its effect on liquidity improvement, we analyze liquidity changes for firms with the highest 
change in excess demand.  Panel B of Table 7 reports the results of liquidity changes for firms in 
the top 20%, based on the change in the two-quarter institutional excess demand.  For this subset 
of firms, the changes in the liquidity measures appear to be even stronger.  The Amihud 
illiquidity measure significantly decreases from 0.43 to 0.35 (t-statistic = -2.33), and share 
turnover significantly increases from 0.99 to 1.07 (t-statistic = 7.00). 
3.5. Innovation and changes in analyst coverage 
To determine the effect of innovation on information production regarding the firm, we 
examine the changes in analyst coverage around patent announcements.  From the IBES detail 
file, we count the number of analysts with outstanding forecasts in quarters around the patent 
publication quarter.  If no analysts cover a stock, the analyst coverage is set to zero.  As in the 
stock liquidity analysis, we have 26,384 unique firm*patent-announcement-quarter observations. 
Panel A of Table 8 reports the results.  We find that analyst coverage increases 
significantly after a firm publishes a patent.  While it is challenging to disentangle simultaneity, 
two intuitive explanations are possible.  First, more analysts may start covering firms with 
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increased institutional ownership.  Second, firm innovation may attract more analysts.  The 
increase in analyst coverage, along with the increase in liquidity, may reflect a decrease in 
information uncertainty between an innovative firm and its investors. 
Next, we attempt to disentangle the simultaneity between analysts’ decisions to follow 
companies and institutions’ decisions to hold these firms, applying the approach similar to that in 
O’Brien and Bhushan (1990). We use two-stage least squares (2SLS) to address endogeneity. In 
the first stage, we regress the change in the number of institutional investors holding the stock on 
a patent announcement dummy, the change in a number of analysts, the net entry of firms to the 
industry, a dummy indicating whether the industry is regulated, quarterly return, the change in a 
natural logarithm of shares outstanding, the change in systematic risk (Δbeta), a lag of a number 
of analysts, and a lag of a number of institutions.  Variable definitions are provided in the caption 
of Table 8. 
We then use the fitted values from this regression as an instrumental variable in the 
second stage.  As in O’Brien and Bhushan (1990), we assume that Δbeta influences analyst 
following only through its effect on institutional investors, since institutions work with clients 
with various preferences for systematic risk.  In the second stage, we therefore regress the change 
in a number of analysts on all the variables from the first stage, excluding the change in 
systematic risk (Δbeta ) and including the fitted values from the first stage. 
The first column in Panel B of Table 8 reports the results for the first stage. A positive 
and highly significant coefficient on Δ#Analysts motivates a closer examination of the joint 
behavior of analysts’ and institutions’ decisions.  The second model in Panel B is the ordinary 
least squares model of the change in a number of analysts covering the stock.  The variable of 
interest, Patent announcement dummy, is positive and significant, indicating the analysts may 
favor innovative firms.  However, a positive and significant coefficient on Δ#Institutions is 
consistent with the concern of simultaneity, and therefore, suggests that the coefficient on our 
variable of interest should be interpreted with care. To address this concern, the third column 
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reports the second-stage results, controlling for endogeneity.  The coefficient on the instrumental 
variable is statistically insignificant, indicated that endogeneity in the second stage is mitigated.  
The coefficient on the patent announcement dummy remains positive and statistically significant.  
From these results, we conclude that firm innovation is likely to attract more analysts. 
3.6.  Alternative explanations for changes in institutional demand 
The results in Table 3 suggest that one reason why institutions exhibit strong demand for 
companies with patent announcements is due to momentum trading (the coefficient on Quarterly 
return is positive and significant at the 1% level).  However, momentum trading does not fully 
explain the change in institutional abnormal demand around patent publications. In this section, 
we consider other possible explanations for the increase in institutional ownership: changes in 
operating performance of a firm, and institutional window-dressing. 
Institutions may be attracted to the firms with patent announcements because these 
companies exhibit significant improvements in operating performance.  We explore this 
possibility estimate the industry-adjusted (FF48) return on assets (operating income before 
depreciation / total assets) in quarters around the patent publication quarter.  The results in Panel 
A of Table 9 suggest no significant improvements in the return on assets around patent 
publications.  We therefore conclude that changes in operating performance do not explain the 
observed increase in institutional excess demand around patent announcements. 
Evidence in the literature suggests an institutional tendency to exhibit window-dressing 
behavior.  For instance, Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler, and Vishny (1991) document that pension 
funds increase their sales of losers in the fourth quarter, when fund investors are likely to monitor 
portfolios more actively.  Ng and Wang (2004) also report the turn-of-the-year behavior by 
institutions.  Given this evidence, we consider the possibility that our results are driven by 
portfolio window-dressing.  We focus on patent announcements in the third quarter and the 
change in institutional excess demand from the second to the fourth calendar quarters.  We then 
compare these results with those associated with patent publications in quarters other than the 
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third quarter (Q1, Q2, and Q4). 
We rerun the analyses in Table 3 with a one-quarter change in excess demand as a 
dependent variable for all patent events in the third quarter and patent publications in other 
quarters.  Panel B of Table 9 reports the results.  The first two columns report the results for 
announcements in the third calendar quarter, and the last two columns contain the results for 
patent publications in all other quarters, except Q3.  The results are stronger for the sub-sample of 
patents announced in all quarters other than the third.  This suggests that institutional window-
dressing behavior is not the reason for the observed changes in demand around patent 
publications. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This study examines institutional trading around patent publications.  There are three 
important dates in the process of obtaining patents:  the application (or filing) date, the 
publication date, and the grant (or issue) date.  We focus on the publication date, because it marks 
the date at which the content of the patent becomes known in the public domain.  Recent studies 
tend to estimate the value of a patent using the number of future citations, but we measure the 
quality of innovation by the three-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around the publication 
date.  Using this approach, based on financial theory, can offer advantages over patent citation 
counts.  Even though future citations may be informative, using them to measure patent value can 
be done only on an ex post basis, after a considerable period of time. 
Our main finding is that institutional investors respond positively to patent 
announcements.  There is a strong positive association between CARs around patent publication 
dates and the change in abnormal institutional demand.  This suggests that institutions are likely 
to recognize the patent value around publications.  In addition, we find that the change in 
abnormal demand is greater when the institutional shareholder base of a company consists of a 
higher percent of institutions with a long-term investment focus. 
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We examine the long-term performance effects of innovation.  Results indicate that 
companies that publish patents significantly outperform those that do not over the three-year 
period following the patent announcement.  This suggests that institutions that increase their 
demand for shares of innovative firms around patent announcements can earn superior returns. 
We also find that the increase in institutional excess demand around patent 
announcements is associated with other important effects for the announcing firm.  Stock 
liquidity and analyst coverage significantly improve after the patent announcement quarter.  It is 
possible that patent announcements reduce information uncertainty at the firm.  Overall, our 
results suggest that corporate innovation is one of the many factors influencing institutional 
demand. 
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Figure 1: Timeline for measuring excess demand 
 
This figure illustrates the timeline of events.  Quarter t is the patent publication quarter. We measure one-
quarter- and two-quarter-excess demand as follows. In each quarter, we estimate cross-sectional regressions 
of the percent change in shares held by all institutional investors, in aggregate, on the contemporaneous 
quarterly return.  For each firm in each quarter, we then estimate the residual.  These residuals serve as our 
proxies for the quarterly excess demand (adjusted for overall increases in institutional ownership and 
returns).  To obtain the two-quarter excess demand, we sum the residuals over two quarters (e.g. the 
residual obtained in quarter (t-1) plus the residual obtained in quarter (t-2)). 
  
Patent 
publication 
quarter 
Measuring one-quarter- 
or two-quarter-excess 
demand 
Measuring one-quarter- 
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Figure 2: Two-quarter institutional excess demand around patent announcements 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the average two-quarter excess demand during one year prior and one year after the 
patent publication quarter for all events in the sample.  Quarter Q(0)  is the patent publication quarter. We 
estimate two-quarter-excess demand as follows. In each quarter, we estimate cross-sectional regressions of 
the percent change in shares held by all institutional investors, in aggregate, on the contemporaneous 
quarterly return.  For each firm in each quarter, we then estimate the residual.  To obtain the two-quarter 
excess demand, we sum the residuals over two quarters (e.g. the residual obtained in quarter (t-k) plus the 
residual obtained in quarter (t-k-1)). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.2
-0.19
-0.18
-0.17
-0.16
-0.15
-0.14
-0.13
-0.12
-0.11
-0.1
Q (-4) Q (-3) Q (-2) Q (-1) Q (0) Q (+1) Q (+2) Q (+3) Q (+4)
Institutional excess demand around the patent publication quarter
96  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Panel A of this table reports abnormal returns around patent announcements and the associated changes 
institutional demand summary statistics, and Panel B describes the industry distribution of the sample and 
the average and median CARs around patent announcements by firms in corresponding industries. The 
sample consists of 2,669 unique firms with 98,883 patent announcement events over the period of 2001-
2009.  The institutional demand variable, percent change in shares held, is measured as of one quarter prior 
to the publication quarter. 
 
Panel A: Patent and institutional demand summary statistics 
Variable Mean Median Std 
25th 
percentile 
75th 
percentile 
Three-day CAR (%) -0.007 -0.086 4.18 -1.93 1.81 
% change in institutional shares held 2.23 0.71 11.50 -2.22 4.64 
Panel B: Industry distribution 
Industry Count Percent 
Mean 
CAR% 
Median 
CAR% 
Electronic Equipment 22,193 22.51 -0.023 -0.130 
Pharmaceutical Products 10,090 10.23 0.050 -0.061 
Business Services 9,090 9.22 -0.069 -0.189 
Machinery 8,216 8.33 -0.034 -0.084 
Computer Hardware 6,784 6.88 -0.012 -0.136 
Medical Equipment 5,331 5.41 0.043 -0.057 
Measuring and Control Equipment 4,543 4.61 -0.076 -0.167 
Automobiles and Trucks 4,497 4.56 -0.233 -0.330 
Chemicals 4,348 4.41 -0.024 0.010 
Consumer Goods 3,140 3.18 -0.069 -0.064 
Petroleum and Natural Gas 2,618 2.66 0.195 0.147 
Electrical Equipment 2,439 2.47 -0.157 -0.276 
Recreation 2,208 2.24 -0.055 -0.225 
Communication 2,062 2.09 -0.014 -0.062 
Aircraft 1,942 1.97 0.038 0.029 
Steel Work 1,254 1.27 0.073 0.027 
Business Supplies 1,247 1.26 -0.060 -0.012 
Construction Materials 948 0.96 
Wholesale 523 0.53 
Food Products 484 0.49 
Entertainment 473 0.48 
Apparel 427 0.43 
Retail 374 0.38 
Trading 368 0.37 
Beer and Liquor 332 0.34 
Agriculture 274 0.28 
Defense 231 0.23 
Textiles 218 0.22 
Rubber and Plastic Products 209 0.21 
Transportation 189 0.19 
Candy and Coda 184 0.19 
Tobacco Products 184 0.19 
Construction 173 0.18 
Shipping Containers 160 0.16 
Banking 159 0.16 
Utilities 153 0.16 
Insurance 131 0.13 
Shipbuilding, Railroad and Equipment 102 0.10 
Healthcare 83 0.08 
Industrial Metal Mining 42 0.04 
Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 40 0.04 
Personal Services 31 0.03 
Fabricated Products 28 0.03 
Printing and Publishing 23 0.02 
Other 22 0.02 
Real Estate 15 0.02 
Precious Metals 9 0.01 
Coal 1 0.00 
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Table 2: Future citations count and cumulative abnormal returns around patent 
publications 
 
Panel A reports the citations summary statistics for all 98,883 patent events in our sample, and Panel B 
reports their distribution with respect to the timing between the publication date of the cited patent and the 
application date of the citing patent.  Panel C examines the relation between CARs around publication date 
and all forward citations.   In each quarter, we sort patent publication events into five equally-sized 
quintiles based on the three-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around the patent publication 
announcement.  We then calculate the average number of future citations associated with patents in each of 
the five quintiles (first column).  The second column of Panel B reports the results of sorting based on 
[CAR*Firm market capitalization].  
Panel A: Citations summary statistics and distribution by year   
  Mean Median 75th percentile 
Total citations  (# of patents=98,883) 4.16 1 4 
Identified public firms 1.66 0 1 
                        Self-citations 0.65 0 0 
                        Other 1 0 1 
Not identified 2.50 1 3 
Panel B: Citations by year  Mean     
All citations with dates 1.31 
1st year 0.30 
2nd year 0.32 
3rd year 0.27 
4th year 0.19 
5th year 0.11     
Panel C: The relation between CARs around publication and future citations 
Quintile 
Sorted based on CAR3 Sorted based on [CAR3*mtkcap] 
# of future citations # of future citations 
Lowest 4.15 4.14 
2 3.81 3.95 
3 3.82 3.58 
4 3.90 3.87 
Highest 3.97 4.23 
Highest - Lowest -0.17** 0.09 
t-statistic (2.03) (0.84) 
 
  
98  
Table 3: Institutional investor response to patent announcements 
 
The dependent variable is the one- (two-) quarter change in institutional excess demand for each firm x 
quarter reported in 13F-filings. Denoting quarter t as the patent publication quarter, we measure one-
quarter- and two-quarter-excess demand as follows. In each quarter, we estimate cross-sectional regressions 
of the percent change in shares held by all institutional investors, in aggregate, on the contemporaneous 
quarterly return for all stocks in the CRSP database.  For each firm in each quarter, we then estimate the 
residual.  These residuals serve as our proxies for the quarterly excess demand (adjusted for overall 
increases in institutional ownership and returns).  To obtain the two-quarter excess demand, we sum the 
residuals over two quarters (e.g. the residual obtained in quarter (t-1) plus the residual obtained in quarter 
(t-2)). We then calculate one-quarter change in excess demand by taking a difference between the excess 
demand in quarter (t+1) and the excess demand in quarter (t-1).  Similarly, we obtain the change in two-
quarter excess demand around the patent announcement quarter. The key explanatory variable is Patent 
announcement that equals 1 if a company announces at least one patent in a given quarter, and 0, otherwise.  
All control variables, except R&D expense / Sales, are measured one quarter prior to the patent publication 
quarter. R&D expense / Sales are measured as of the end of the year preceding the patent publication year.  
All regressions include time (quarter) and industry (Fama-French 48) fixed effects.  Standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% level.  T-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. Symbols ***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 
One-quarter change in 
excess demand 
Two-quarter change in 
excess demand  
Patent Announcement dummy 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.026*** 0.032***  
(6.01) (4.11) (5.48) (5.15) 
Log(market capitalization)  0.001  -0.003* 
 (1.05)  (-1.85) 
R&D expense / Sales  -0.0003  -0.0008 
 (-1.14)  (-1.30) 
Quarterly return  0.050***  0.101*** 
 (4.95)  (7.71) 
% long-term institutions  0.300***  0.551*** 
 (10.32)  (10.82) 
Intercept -0.043*** -0.246*** -0.076*** -0.321*** 
(-3.76) (-4.86) (-3.99) (-3.67) 
Time and FF48 industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
St. errors clustered at the firm 
level Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of observations 209,863 95,527 200,813 91,767 
R2 (%) 0.18 0.78 0.15 0.97  
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Table 4: Change in institutional excess demand and CARs around patent announcements - 
Univariate analysis  
 
Panel A reports the univariate results of the relation between changes in institutional excess demand and 
the three-day CARS around patent announcements. In each quarter, we sort patent publication events into 
ten equally-sized deciles based on the three-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around the patent 
publication announcement and estimate the average one-quarter and two-quarter change in excess demand 
around the patent publication quarter for each decile.  Panel B reports the results of the falsification test.  
The falsification test is performed similarly to the sorting procedure described above, except that the patent 
publication date is moved exactly 2 years back in time. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% 
level. Symbols ***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Change in excess demand and three-day CARs  
Decile (based on CAR3) Average CAR3 One-quarter change in excess demand around publication 
Two-quarter change in excess 
demand around publication 
Lowest -0.073 -0.008 -0.011 
2 -0.035 0.002 0.005 
3 -0.021 0.002 0.004 
4 -0.012 0.004 0.010 
5 -0.004 0.003 0.008 
6 0.002 0.003 0.012 
7 0.010 0.003 0.010 
8 0.019 0.004 0.010 
9 0.035 0.005 0.010 
Highest 0.077 0.007 0.013 
Highest - Lowest 0.015*** 0.024*** 
T-statistic (4.82) (3.91) 
 
Panel B: Falsification test  
Decile (based on CAR3) One-quarter change in excess demand around publication 
Two-quarter change in 
excess demand around 
publication 
Lowest -0.010 -0.013 
2 -0.001 0.000 
3 -0.004 0.004 
4 0.002 0.009 
5 -0.001 0.003 
6 -0.002 0.001 
7 -0.004 0.005 
8 -0.002 0.005 
9 -0.003 0.003 
Highest -0.007 -0.018 
Highest - Lowest 0.003 -0.005 
T-statistic (0.56) (-0.76)   
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Table 5:  Change in institutional excess demand and CARs around patent announcements - 
Multivariate analysis 
 
The dependent variable is the one- (two-) quarter change in excess demand around the patent publication 
quarter.  All control variables, except R&D expense / Sales, are measured one quarter prior to the patent 
publication quarter. R&D expense / Sales are measured as of the end of the year preceding the patent 
publication year.  Percent of long-term institutions is the fraction of dedicated and quasi-indexed investors in 
the company's institutional shareholder base. All regressions include time (quarter) and industry (Fama-French 
48) fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 
1% level.  T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Symbols ***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
One-quarter change in excess 
demand around publication 
Two-quarter change in excess 
demand around publication 
CAR3  0.101*** 0.118*** 0.114*** 0.146*** 0.163*** 0.157*** 
(5.35) (6.17) (6.02) (4.72) (5.14) (5.00) 
Log(market capitalization) -0.0002 -0.003*** 0.0002 -0.005*** 
(-0.44) (-4.51) (0.21) (-4.03) 
R&D expense / Sales -0.001 -0.001 -0.00004 0.0007 
(-1.33) (-0.94) (-0.02) (0.37) 
Quarterly return 0.093*** 0.099*** 0.107*** 0.118*** 
(10.39) (11.12) (7.86) (8.75) 
% long-term institutions 0.166*** 0.320*** 
(9.66) (9.48) 
Intercept -0.023 -0.002 -0.072 -0.017 0.029 -0.101 
(0.78) (-0.05) (-1.22) (-0.23) (0.39) (-1.27) 
Time and FF48 industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
St. errors clustered at the firm level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of observations 72,279 65,808 65,808 72,093 65,685 65,685 
R2 (%) 14.80 17.66 18.13 18.17 20.54 21.23 
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Table 6: Long-term performance  
 
We estimate long-term returns of firms that introduce patents and compare with returns of firms that do not 
(control sample). We construct our control sample as follows.  The set of matched firms is obtained on the 
basis on time, industry, size, and the change in institutional excess demand.  For a firm in a given quarter, 
we select the candidates for a match from the same industry (Fama and French 48) and whose market 
capitalization is between 70% and 130% of the treatment firm size.  From this list of firms, we then choose 
the firm with the one-quarter change in excess demand around the patent publication that is the closest to 
the change in excess demand around this quarter of the treatment firm. In addition, we require that a control 
firm does not introduce any patents during the 12-month horizon following the publication date of the 
treatment firm. As a result, we obtain a control group with 21,126 observations for our sample of 26,384 
unique firm*quarter observations. Next, we compare the long-term performance of the treatment and 
control groups, including returns measured over 12, 24, and 36 months after the publication quarter. Long-
term returns are calculated by compounding monthly stock returns. We winsorize the obtained returns at 
the 1% level.  T-statistics (reported in parentheses) are based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors.  
Symbols ***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Average return over 
12 months after 
publication 
 
Average return over 
24 months after 
publication 
Average return over 
36 months after 
publication 
Treatment group 0.1539 0.2662 0.2998 
Control group 0.1067 0.2184 0.2519 
Difference 0.0472*** 0.0478*** 0.0479*** 
t-statistics (7.70) (4.41) (3.10) 
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Table 7: Liquidity changes around patent announcements 
 
Panel A of this table reports liquidity changes around patent announcements for 26,384 firm*patent-
announcement-quarter observations. Panel B reports changes in liquidity for firms in the top 20% based on 
the change in two-quarter institutional excess demand.  The Amihud illiquidity measure is constructed as in 
Amihud (2002).  Turnover is a ratio of a daily trading volume to the total shares outstanding, averaged 
across all trading days in a quarter, times 100.  Q(0) denotes the patent publication quarter. T-statistics are 
calculated based on the quarterly cross-sectional averages. Symbols ***, **, and * indicate the statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Liquidity changes around patent announcements 
 Quarter relative to the patent announcement quarter     
 Q(-2) Q(-1) Q(0) Q(+1) Q(+2)     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (2) – (1) (3) – (2) (4) – (3) (5) – (4) 
Amihud 
Illiquidity 0.3873 0.4074 0.3984 0.3992 0.3707 0.0201 -0.0089 0.0008 -0.0285** 
t-stat      (1.63) (-0.71) (0.06) (-1.96) 
          
Turnover 1.0314 1.0307 1.0317 1.0453 1.0651 -0.0007 0.0010 0.0136*** 0.0198*** 
t-stat      (-0.22) (0.32) (3.85) (5.44) 
          
Panel B: Liquidity changes around patent announcements for firms with the highest change in excess demand (top 20%) 
 Mean[Q(-2); Q(-1)] Mean[Q(+1); Q(+2)] Difference 
Amihud Illiquidity 0.4307 0.3465 -0.0842** 
t-stat   (-2.33) 
    
Turnover 0.9897 1.0698 0.0801*** 
t-stat   (7.00) 
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Table 8:  Analyst coverage changes around patent announcements 
 
Panel A of this table reports the analyst coverage changes around patent announcements for 26,384 
firm*patent-announcement-quarter observations. From the IBES detail file, we count the number of 
analysts with outstanding forecasts in quarters around patent publications for the firms in our sample. If a 
company does not have coverage, the number of analysts is set to zero. This table also reports the changes 
in analyst coverage for firms sorted by the two-quarter change in institutional excess demand around patent 
announcements. Q(0) denotes the patent publication quarter. Panel B reports the multivariate analysis 
results with a correction for endogeneity, following O’Brien and Bhushan (1990).  #Analysts is the number 
of analysts with outstanding estimates of earnings per share available in the IBES summary file. 
#Institutions is the number of institutions holding the stock, as reported in Thomson Financial. SICGRO is 
the net entry of firms to the industry (based on the three-digit SIC code listed in CRSP) over the five-year 
period.  Net entry is defined as the number of new firms listed in CRSP for the industry minus the number 
of firms exiting the industry, divided by the number of firms that were in the industry at the beginning of 
the period. Regulated industry takes the value 1 if the industry in is SIC 421, 483, 493, 612, 621, 633, 805, 
or 809; and 0, otherwise. Return is the quarterly stock return obtained by compounding monthly returns. 
Log(shares outstanding) is a natural logarithm of the number of shares outstanding. Beta is the estimated 
systematic risk from a market model regression using CRSP value-weighted returns, estimated with 
monthly observations over the three-year period. Symbols ***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Analyst coverage – Univariate analysis  
 Analyst coverage 
 Mean[Q(-2); Q(-1)] (1) 
Mean[Q(+1); Q(+2)] 
(2) 
Difference 
(2) – (1) 
All 6.138 6.214 0.076*** 
t-stat   (5.60) 
 
Sorted by the change in excess demand    
Low quintile 5.242 5.472 0.230*** 
t-stat   (7.90) 
2 7.921 8.103 0.182*** 
t-stat   (6.26) 
3  8.361 8.488 0.127*** 
t-stat   (4.40) 
4 7.504 7.627 0.123*** 
t-stat   (4.11) 
Top quintile  5.608 5.883 0.275*** 
t-stat   (8.29) 
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Panel B: Analyst coverage – Multivariate analysis 
 
OLS 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
2SLS 
(3) 
Δ#Institutions(t-1)→(t+1) Δ #Analysts(t-1)→(t+1) Δ #Analysts(t-1)→(t+1) 
Patent announcement dummyt -0.002 0.15*** 0.16*** 
(-0.00) (3.46) (3.99) 
Δ #Institutions(t-1)→(t+1) 0.01*** -0.03 
(12.55) (-0.96) 
Δ #Analysts(t-1)→(t+1) 1.21*** 
(12.70) 
SICGRO -1.14** 0.08 0.03 
(-2.34) (1.54) (0.53) 
Regulated industry 1.14** -0.05 -0.002 
(2.21) (-0.92) (-0.03) 
Returnt 17.90*** -0.14 0.67 
(16.38) (-1.63) (1.15) 
Δ log(shares outstanding) (t-1)→(t+1) 37.17*** 0.92*** 2.69** 
(5.37) (2.98) (2.14) 
Δ beta(t-1)→(t+1) -0.55** 0.02 
(-2.54) (1.08) 
Lag # of analystst-2 0.23*** -0.14*** -0.13*** 
(4.83) (-25.11) (-35.93) 
Lag # of institutionst-2 -0.02*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 
(6.25) (17.32) (9.17) 
Intercept 2.64*** 0.26*** 0.39*** 
(12.24) (12.84) (4.04) 
# of observations 25,951 25,951 25,951 
R2 (%) 6.00 8.55 6.87 
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Table 9:  Alternative explanations 
 
Panel A of this table reports changes in industry-adjusted (FF48) return on assets (ROA) around patent 
announcements.  ROA is a ratio of operating income before depreciation (Compustat item 21) to total 
assets (Compustat item 44). We use industry median for the adjustment. Panel B reports institutional 
response to patent announcements made in the third calendar quarter and in quarters Q1, Q2, and Q4. Q(0) 
denotes the patent publication quarter. T-statistics are calculated based on the quarterly cross-sectional 
averages. Symbols ***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Changes in industry-adjusted ROA around the patent announcement quarter 
  Quarter relative to the patent announcement quarter         
 
Q(-2) 
 
Q(-1) 
 
Q(0) 
 
Q(+1) 
 
Q(+2) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (2)-(1) (3)-(2) (4)-(3) (5)-(4) 
ROA (%) -0.13 -0.28 -0.35 -0.34 -0.33 -0.15 -0.07 0.01 0.01 
t-stat (-2.06) (-0.94) (0.03) (0.13) 
Panel B: One-quarter change in excess demand in the third calendar quarter and in quarters Q1, Q2, and Q4 
  
Announcements in Q3 Announcements in Q1, Q2, and Q4 
      
Patent Announcement dummy 0.020*** 0.013 0.019*** 0.014*** 
(2.61) (1.64) (4.37) (3.21) 
Log(market capitalization) -0.016*** -0.010*** 0.000 0.004*** 
(-6.77) (-3.88) (0.02) (3.46) 
R&D expense / Sales -0.001 -0.0003 -0.001 -0.0003 
(-1.12) (-0.46) (-1.60) (-0.81) 
Quarterly return 0.013 0.021 0.052*** 0.059*** 
(0.79) (1.20) (4.17) (4.81) 
% long-term institutions 0.355*** 0.282*** 
(5.55) (7.82) 
Intercept 0.515*** 0.147 -0.093* -0.383*** 
(3.25) (0.87) (-1.83) (-6.15) 
Time and FF48 industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
St. errors clustered at the firm level Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of observations 23,792 23,728 71,972 71,799 
R2 (%) 0.71 1.26 0.47 0.80 
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